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The First Annual Kentucky
Court of Appeals Review
FOREWORD
By JoHN BATr0
The Kentucky Court of Appeals annual review is new evidence
of the generative quality of the young mind. It is a bright and fresh
approach to law journal service. The review is solely the work-harvest
of the Law journal students. To pun poorly on an old song (too old
for these students to have heard )-Yes, sir, it's their baby.
Since this is the first review, we can view it in a Spockian sense.
That is, it will mature over the years. No doubtl However, unlike
most babies, this "youngling" can stand, walk and run on its own legs.
I am certain that the review will become an established institution.
And this institution will work with two things in mind. First, to
provide the practitioner with a superior research service. Second, to
place at the disposal of national legal scholars the end-statements and
analysis of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. To sum: This issue is
dedicated to these purposes and, as I see it, to the intellectual intoxica-
tion and vista-vision that youth possesses.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
During the 1962-1963 term, the court of appeals rendered nine
decisions involving various provisions of the federal and state con-
stitutions. The cases of greatest interest were: Arlan's Department
Store v. Commonwealth,' in which Kentucky's Sunday closing law2
was challenged as being "void for vagueness"; McIntosh v. Common-
wealth,3 which delineated the extent of an indigent's right to court-
appointed counsel on appeal in light of recent Supreme Court de-
cisions on that subject;4 and Commonwealth v. Brinkley,5 which con-
cerned the admissability into evidence of tape recordings where the
method by which the recordings were obtained was attacked as
being an unconstitutional "search and seizure" and a violation of the
Federal Communications Act, section 605. The remaining six cases
involved questions ranging from racial discrimination in jury selection,6
the mandatory provision of the statute requiring voting machines,7
and interpretation of Kentucky's murder statute in common law
terms s to the department of agriculture's summary power to kill a
cow,9 to a prisoner's right to credit on his sentence,10 and a unique
problem arising out of Frankfort's transition from third class council-
manic government to second class city manager type."
For the second time in a year, Arlan's Department Store v. Com-
monwealth12 brought Kentucky's Sunday closing law before the court
of appeals for interpretation and reconciliation with the Federal Con-
stitution. On the first hearing of this case, the court held that the law
did not violate constitutional guarantees and prohibitions with respect
to religion, was a proper exercise of the police power, was not
discriminatory or arbitrary, nor was its enforcement a violation of
Arlan's right to equal protection of the law.13
On this appeal Arlan's contended, inter alia, that the statute was
'369 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1963).
2Ky. Rev. Stat. § 436.160 (1963) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
3 368 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1963).
4Douglas v. California, 872 U.S. 858 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 872
U.S. 835 (1963).
5 862 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1962).
6 Martin v. Commonwealth, 861 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962).
7 Lackey v. Garner, 867 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1963).
8 Pryor v. Thomas, 861 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1962).
9 Spillman v. Beauchamp, 862 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1962).1o Fowler v. Black, 864 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1968).
11'City of Frankfort v. Triplett, 865 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1963).
128369 S.W.2d 9 (Ky. 1963).
13 Commonwealth v. Arlan's Department Store, 857 S.W.2d 708 (Ky. 1962),
appeal dismissed, 83 Sup. Ct. 277 (1963).
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too vague to be enforceable, relying on the "void for vagueness" rule.14
Arlan's argued that the exemption of "works of necessity" from the
operation of the statute created an area of doubt as to what Sunday
business is permissable and what is not, and thus what is criminal
conduct under the statute and what is not. This question was new for
Kentucky and has not yet been considered by the Supreme Court.
It was discussed briefly in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in
McGowan v. State,'1 where he pointed out that the "... effect of the
phrase has been to give the courts a wide range of discretion in
determining exceptions."'
The court, almost giving recognition to the fact that the enforce-
ment of the law has been erratic and the exemption of works of
necessity as "long as the chancellor's foot,"17 admitted the strength of
appellant's argument.
Heretofore this court has always taken for granted . . . that the term
"works of necessity" is sufficiently understandable, within the context of
the Sunday closing law, for practical application. We now formally
confirm that viewpoint. Concededly the language is loose. So is the
conception of the "reasonable man" the most useful tool of Anglo-
American law.'
8
The court left little doubt that the statute as it now reads-with the
judge in each instance determining what is and what is not a work of
necessity-is constitutional and that any further complaints should be
taken to the legislature.
McIntosh v. Commonwealth' is of special interest. In that case
appellant challenged his conviction on grounds that counsel was not
provided to prepare his appeal. The court of appeals was forced to
14 Where the law-making body in framing the law has not expressed its
intent intelligibly, or in language at the people upon whom it is designed to
operate or whom it affects can understand, or from which the courts can deduce
the legislative will, the statute will be declared void and inoperative. See Burke
v. Stephenson, 305 S.W.2d 926 (Ky. 1957).
15 366 U.S. 420 (1960).
16 Id. at 527.
17Kentucky decisions construing "works of necessity" are: Natural Gas
Products Co. v. Thurman, 205 Ky. 100; 265 S.W. 475 (1924) (The manufacture
of carbon black is a work of necessity.); McAfee v. Commonwealth, 173 Ky. 83,
190 S.W. 671 (1917) (The sale of sodawater, soft drinks, cigars, and tobacco is
not a work of necessity, but the sale of sandwiches and canned goods is.); Gray
v. Commonwealth 171 Ky. 269, 188 S.W. 854 (1916) (A barbershop is not a
work of necessity. ); Page v. O'Sullivan, 159 Ky. 703, 169 S.W. 542 (1914) (The
attendance of a prison guard at a state penitentiary is a work of necessity.);
Commonwealth v. London, 149 Ky. 372, 149 S.W. 852 (1912) (The sale of candy,
fruits, chocolate, ice cream, bread and butter sandwiches, and coffee is within the
exception of work of necessity.).
:8 Arlan's Department Store v. Commonwealth, 369 S.W.2d 9, 13 (Ky. 1963).
19368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1963).
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consider the recent Supreme Court decisions of Gideon v. Wain-
wright2" and Douglas v. California2' in deciding the case.
McIntosh was assisted by court-appointed counsel during his trial,
and the jury returned a verdict of guilty under the state habitual
criminal statute in October, 1958.22 Appellants counsel entered a
motion for a new trial as their last act on appellant's behalf. In No-
vember, McIntosh was brought to the judge's chambers without
counsel, his motion for new trial was denied and judgment entered.
The record shows that, at his request, he was given until Feberuary
to prepare for appeal, and that during the interim he was kept in the
county jail. There was no evidence that appellant requested counsel
during this time.
Appellant moved that his conviction be set aside under section
60.02 of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure [hereinafter referred
to as CR.] He alleged that section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution
guaranteed counsel in criminal trials, that this meant counsel "at every
step of the way," and that since counsel had not been present at the
pronouncement of judgment, his conviction must be set aside.
The court held that, although an indigent defendant is entitled
to counsel "at every step of the way,"23 a verdict and judgment cannot
be set aside simply because counsel was not present during the
otherwise proper sentencing. The reason is that the court has no
discretion in determining punishment and sentencing is more ceremony
than substance. The court further noted that if appellant felt that the
lack of counsel at sentencing had deprived him in any way of asserting
good and substantial grounds for forestalling the judgment, it would
have been proper for him to have raised this objection under CR
60.02, but that he had not done so.
The court noted that, in light of their holding, formal pronounce-
ment of sentence in the defendant's presence was not a constitutional
right. This would not be true in the situation where the defendant
pleads guilty and the judge has discretion in assessing the quantum of
punishment.
McIntosh also asserted as grounds for setting aside his conviction
that the right to appeal was guaranteed him by statute,24 yet the trial
court had not supplied him with counsel to help prepare an appeal.
The court first noted that a motion to set aside the verdict was not a
20372 U.S. 335 (1963).
21372 U.S. 353 (1963).
22KRS 431.190.
23PoweU v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1961).
24 KRS 21.140(1).
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proper motion, but that, as the question presented was one of first
impression, the appeal would be treated as an application for
appropriate relief. The court, in dealing with the "most nettlesome
problem in the case," was faced with several complications. Although
appellate review as such is not a constitutional right, Kentucky Revised
Statute section 21.140 [hereinafter referred to as KRS] authorizes
original appeal in this instance as a matter of right; furthermore, equal
protection of the laws since the Douglas case requires the indigent be
supplied with counsel where appeal is guaranteed by statute, and
mere failure to ask for counsel is not, at least at the trial level, con-
sidered a waiver of the right to counsel.25
In reaching the conclusion that the defendant was not denied due
process, the court emphasized that the appellant had proper counsel
during trial, that the trial court was never advised during Mcntosh's
incarceration that he had been abandoned by counsel, and that
McIntosh never requested counsel to help prepare his appeal.
After emphasizing that the right to counsel on appeal stands on a
different footing than the right to counsel at the trial level, the court
concluded its opinion by saying:
"Equal protection" gives to the indigent defendant a right to counsel
and to a transcript of the record on appeal if he requests it. In the
absence of such a request it does not, in our opinion, oblige the court
either to initiate an inquiry or to extend an invitation to appeal... 26
Commonwealth v. Brinkley27 was a case of first impression in Ken-
tucky. The question presented was whether a tape recording of a
conversation between a principal witness and the defendant should be
admitted into evidence where that recording was obtained: (1) by
attaching the microphone of the recorder to the earpiece of the prin-
cipal witness' telephone with permission of the witness; or (2) by
placing the recorder in the trunk of the principal witness' car and
inducing the defendant to make statements while in the car.
Although it could have excluded this type evidence for policy
considerations, the court held: (1) that the means of obtaining such
recordings do not constitute "interceptions" within the meaning of
section 605 of the Federal Communication Act;28 (2) that the Federal
Communications Act does not act as a bar to the admissability of
25 Gholson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 82, 212 S.W.2d 537 (1948).
26 McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Ky. 1963).
27 362 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1962).
28 Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958), which provides in
part, "[N]o person, not being authorized by the sender, shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,, purport,
effeet, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person....
[Vol 52,
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evidence in state proceedings; 29 and (3) that the recordings were not
"seizures" within the concept of the fourth amendment prohibition
against illegal searches and seizures30 so that they would be excluded
under the fourteenth amendment.31 Therefore, the court of appeals
said, it was not error for the trial court to admit the recordings if a
proper foundation was laid.
32
Justice Moremen, in dissenting, expressed grave concern over
"abandoning a tenent of legal philosophy at a time when it is needed
most,"3 that tenent being our right to be secure from unwarranted
intrusion.
In the case of Martin v. Commonwealth,3 4 a Negro appealed from
a conviction of murder by an all-white jury, contending that he was
deprived of equal protection of the laws because only three Negroes
were called for jury duty at that term of court. No proof was disclosed
concerning proportions of Negroes to whites in the county or the ratio
of Negroes to whites on the tax commissioner's books or on the voter
registration lists.3 5 Counsel relied on Gilchrist v. Commonwealth,
3
6
in which a conviction of manslaughter was reversed on proof that
Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service. The court
distinguished this case on its facts and said, "it is our view no case
has been made out which in any wise supports appellants assertion
that negroes are prohibited from performing jury duty in Fayette
County.... ."37 The test is whether the commissioners acted in good
faith in their selection of names for the jury wheel. The appeal from
the retrial of the Gilchrist08 case was cited by the court as an example.
In that case the court affirmed a murder conviction where the ratio of
Negro to white in the county was one to six, and, out of ninety-six
names, only one Negro was called for jury duty.
In Lackey v. Garner,39 the trial court held KRS 118.450(4) uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that the provisions of that statute making it
mandatory that counties purchase voting machines were in direct
conflict with section 147 of the Kentucky Constitution. The court of
29 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
30 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927); Williams v. Ball, 294
F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961).
3l Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).32 McIntosh v. Commonwealth, supra note 26, at 497; citing Wright v. State,
38 Ala. App. 64, 79 So. 2d 66 (1954), and Solomon v. Edgar, 92 Ga. App. 207,
88 S.E.2d 167 (1955).33 McIntosh v. Commonwealth, supra note 26, at 498.
34 361 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962).
35 See KRS 29.045(3).
36311 Ky. 230, 223 S.W. 2d 880 (1949).
37 Martin v. Commonwealth, supra note 6, at 655.
38 Gilchrist v. Commonwealth, 246 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1952).
39367 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1963).
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appeals reversed. The statute in question provides that "each county
shall acquire voting machines....-40 The allegedly conflicting con-
stitutional provision states that "counties so desiring may use voting
machines. .".."41 The trial court relied on the court of appeals' con-
struction of section 144 of the constitution, which contains a similar
"may" provision with regard to election commissioners. 42 In Billiter v.
Nelson,43 the court had held that the constitution was intended to give
counties an option in the use of election commissioners and that this
precluded subsequent mandatory legislation on the subject. In the
principal case, the court overruled the Billiter case as too restrictive,
holding that an option granted by the constitution does not "preclude
a... mandatory requirement by the general assembly."
44
Judge Palmore, in concurring, said, "it would appear self-evident
that the . ..provisions .. .under which counties 'may' do certain
things on their own ... without enabling legislation, are not incon-
sistent with the power of the legislature to require that those things
be done."45
Judge Montgomery, in dissenting, recognized the problem con-
cerning voting machines and the desirability of their use but urged
that "this does not justify abusing the plain meaning of simple words
and violating the constitution."46 He stated further that where an
amendment has been passed making the use of voting machines per-
missive, this by construction clearly amounts to a constitutional
limitation against mandatory legislation in this area.
In Pryor v. Thomas,47 a convicted murderer contended that the
Kentucky homocide statute48 violated due process in that it did not
define the nature of the crime. He asserted that the statute does not
create the crime by merely fixing the punishment. Appellant further
complained that the indictment was framed in common law terms,
asserting that this was not authorized by the statute. In a brief resume
of the origin of the common law in this country and its application
in Kentucky, the court held that the statute was completely adequate
when viewed in light of section 283 of the Kentucky Constitution,
which adopts the common law in Virginia. In summing up its position,
the court stated that "it has long been accepted by the bench and
4o KRS 118.450(4).
41 Ky. Const. § 147 (1962).42 Ky. Const. § 144 (1962).
43 300 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1957).
4 4 Lackey v. Garner, supra note 7, at 258.
45 Id. at 259.
46 Ibid.
47 361 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1962).
48 KRS 435,010,
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bar that the common law prevails unless changed by the constitution
or statutes,"49 citing Nider v. Commonwealth50 for a good statement
of this principle.
In Spillman v. Beauchamp,51 agents of the department of agricul-
ture, pursuant to a statute providing for the slaughtering of diseased
animals, 2 had entered the plaintiff's property and without his par-
ticipation or permission removed and slaughtered his cow. The plain-
tiff contended that the killing of the allegedly diseased animal without
a prior hearing deprived him of property without due process. The
court affirmed a judgment for the defendant, holding that where the
owner refused to participate in the appraisal and slaughtering as
contemplated by statute, a reasonable interpretation of the statute
would permit action without him. On the question of due process, the
court said:
The rule is firmly established that under the police power the govern-
ment may cause the summary killing of an animal believed to be
diseased, without giving the owner a prior hearing. All that is required
. . . is . . . the opportunity subsequently to litigate the question of
whether the animal was in fact diseased, and be provided a remedy in
damages in the event it is proved that the animal was not diseased.5 3
Another question of due process arose in Fowler v. Black.5 4 IKRS
197.045 permits the division of correction of the department of welfare
to allow a prisoner to earn credit on his sentence up to ten days a
month for good behavior. This statute also authorizes the division to
cancel accumulated credit and to deny the prisoner the right to earn
credit in the future if the prisoner violates rules of the institution.
The court held that cancellation under the statute did not deprive
Fowler of his rights without due process, because the right was not
vested but conditional upon good behavior.
In City of Frankffort v. Triplett,55 the question was whether the
office of police clerk was abolished by statutes governing changes in
the form of government. Frankfort had changed from a third class to
a second class city and had adopted a city council form of government.
The relevant statutes literally abolished all nonelective city offices for
cities with this form. 6 Appellee, a police clerk, had been receiving a
salary by ordinance, of 275 dollars a month. A new council, upon
49 Pryor v. Thomas, supra note 8, at 280.
5o 140 Ky. 684, 131 S.W. 1024 (1910).
51362 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1962).
52 KRS 257.110.
5
3 Spillman v. Beauchamp, supra note 9, at 35.
54364 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1963).
55 365 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1963).
50 KRS 89.040. See also KRS 89.420, 26.570, and 26.580.
19641
646 KENTUCKY LAw JOURNAL
talking office, passed another ordinance reducing his salary to thirty
dollars a month. Appellee contested this ordinance, and the city
contended that the office was abolished by statute upon the changing
of the form of government, and further that the ordinance was within
their legislative power. The court of appeals rejected the first con-
tention summarily and held further that the ordinance was an abuse
of legislative power. The court stated that the legislative branch could
not exercise control over created judicial officers, especially when the
office is created by the general assembly, nor could it effectively abolish
the office by reducing the salary to almost nothing.
II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. CHndM AL INSAN rr'
The M'Naghten rule may be allowed to return to the nineteenth
century, but the return trip promises to be stormy. Terry v. Common-
wealth57 harbingers a fresh approach in Kentucky to the controversial
instruction for insanity. In the Terry case, the court of appeals held
that the right-wrong and irresistible-impulse instruction was inade-
quate as the test of criminal insanity. In its place, the court established
the following instruction:
Before the defendant can be excused on the ground of insanity the jury
must believe from the evidence that at the time of the killing, the
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, (a) was substantially
unable to understand that he was violating the law, or, (b) if he did
understand it, was nevertheless substantially unable to resist his impulse
to commit the illegal act.58
The court defined mental disease or defect as "not including an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct."59
The court was dissatisfied with the old instruction because it felt
that the traditional phraseology therein defined the law in terms of
moral right and wrong instead of legal criminality and therefore
impaired the capacity of medical witnesses to assist the court and jury.
The court pointed out that the new rule is similar to section 4.01 of the
Model Penal Code which was approved by the American Law Institute
in 1962. That rule is the standard in Vermont and the third federal
circuit.6o
In dissenting, Judge Montgomery reminded the court of Newsome
v. Commonwealth.(" In that case, which was decided less than thirty
days before the Terry case, the court affirmed the M'Naghten rule and
pointed out that the rule had been embodied in Kentucky criminal
law for sixty-three years. Judge Montgomery indicated that the
difference between the old rule and the new was purely technical,
and that to change such a long standing rule for an unjustifiable
reason destroys all of the stability characteristic of the law.62
57 371 S.W.2d 862 (1963).
US Id. at 865.
59 Ibid.60 Note, 1 Washburn L.J. 463 (1961). The jurisdictional survey is as
follows: M Naghten Rule-thirty states; right-wrong and irresistible-impulse rule
-seventeen states, United States military law, and all but one of the federal
circuits; Durham Rule-two states, District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.
For the third federal circuit see United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir.
1961).
61 866 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1962).
62 Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862, 866 (1963).
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Further oil was poured on the fire in the Terry case by fudge
Palmore's statement in his concurring opinion that:
The dissenting opinion's discussion of the recent Newsome case would
leave the impression that the court had resolved and settled the question.
The fact is that five members of the court were then dissatisfied with
the old instruction and would not have affirmed in that case had it in-
volved a death sentence. The Terry case was under submission at the
time, and it was clearly understood that the old instruction would not
survive it. (Emphasis added.)63
B. PaGHT To COUNSEL
In Bauer v. Commonwealth,6 4 the court held that an accused has
no constitutional right to counsel during the investigation, non-judicial
stage of a case. Bauer's attorney was not permitted to see him during
the eleven hour pre-arraingment questioning by the police. Deciding
this point for the first time, the court brought Kentucky in line with
federal law.65 The absence of counsel at this stage is a circumstance
to be considered in determining whether the confession was in fact
coerced. The court felt that a contrary ruling would unduly impair
the ability of the police to solve difficult cases. In McIntosh v. Com-
monwealth,66 the court ruled that the defendant was not deprived of
his constitutional right to counsel merely because there was no counsel
present at the time of sentencing. Allocution and formal pronounce-
ment of sentence in the defendant's presence are not constitutional
rights, but statutory procedures. This question had not previously
been decided by the court, though it has been so decided in several
other states.67 In Rice v. Davis,6 8 the court determined that when a
court appointed attorney failed to obtain a court reporter upon request
of his client and thereafter failed to object to the court's denial of the
client's request,69 the attorney exhibited such a lack of due diligence
that his client was in effect denied his right to counsel.
C. HABEAS CoRPUs
Rice v. Davis7° broadened the scope of the writ of habeas corpus.
Previously, the writ had applied only to questions of the court's juris-
63 Id. at 867.
64 364 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1963).
65 Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
483 (1958).
66 368 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1963).
67 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1574, n.67-67.50 (1961).
68366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).
69 KRS 28.430 provides that upon motion of either party the court shall order
the reporter to make a full and accurate transcript.70 Rice v. Davis, 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).
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diction of the offense and of the person accused. In the Rice case, the
defendant had no opportunity for an appeal because the court ap-
pointed attorney had not obtained a court reporter. The lack of
appeal brought about by the negligence of counsel was such an
extreme irregularity that the judgment was considered void by the
court.7 1 Under the new rule if irregularities which will shock the
conscience of the court occur before judgment and sentencing, and if
the irregularities deprive the accused of his fundamental rights, there
is an absence of jurisdiction of the court and the writ is the proper
remedy. This change brings Kentucky into conformity with the federal
rule.72
D. SEARca AN SEIZURE
Commonwealth v. Brinkley73 involved the admissibility of two
recorded conversations between the prosecuting witness and the
defendant. Both recordings were made with the consent of the
prosecuting witness. One was procured by attaching a microphone
to the telephone receiver in the prosecuting witness' home; the other
was obtained by an officer hidden in the trunk of an automobile. The
court, in a case of first impression, held both recordings were admis-
sible, providing the proper foundation was laid. Although section 605
of the Federal Communications Act74 does not apply to the states,75
the court concluded that even had this been a federal case, the
recordings would not have violated the Act because (1) such com-
munications are not privileged, (2) one party may not bind the other
to secrecy merely by using a telephone, (3) one entitled to receive a
communication may use it for his own benefit or have another use
it for him,70 and (4) evidence offered in the form of a sound recording
is not inadmissible per se.77 Also, there was no violation of a fourth
amendment right, since there was no unauthorized physical encroach-
ment within a constitutionally protected area.78 Proper foundation
consists of showing the following: (1) the manner of preserving the
recording and the manner of identifying the speakers, (2) the
7 1Id. at 155.
72 Diggs. v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (1945).
73 362 S.W.2d 494 (Ky. 1962).
74 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934) provides in part: "...no person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge...
contents ... of such intercepted communication to any person.
75 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).76 Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); Carnes v. United States,
295 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961).7 7 Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1008, 1029 (1956).
78 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States,
316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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competency of the recording device and the operator, (3) the
authenticity, correctness and completeness of the recording, and (4)
absence of coersion7 9
In Fields v. Commonwealth,"0 officers searched a home under a
warrant issued for the search of illegal alcoholic beverages. They
find automobile tires, cartons of cigarettes, and several shotguns with
boxes of shells. The officers had knowledge of recent break-ins in the
community in which tires and cigarettes had been stolen. The court
held that the search was valid even though the seized objects were
not described in the search warrant, because the objects seized were
articles of which possession is illegal per se. The general rule is that
where entry upon the premise is lawful, contraband open to observa-
tion may be seized."' This rule had been applied in Pigg v. Common-
wealth82 to a situation where an income tax investigator with no
search warrant was given permission by the owner to search for
evidence of income tax evasion. The investigator found liquor instead.
The court ruled that the evidence was properly seized and was
admissible in a prosecution for selling liquor in a dry county. In the
Fields case, the court reasoned that the theory of the Pigg case was
applicable, since in both instances the entrance was permissive and
therefore legal.
E. Jumius
In Smith v. Commonwealth,83 the court determined that the trial
judge properly permitted members of the jury to make telephone calls
concerning their needs relative to their overnight stay. The calls
were made in the presence of a deputy sheriff who heard the con-
versations of the jurors but did not hear what was said from the
other end of the line, while another deputy remained with the other
jurors during the time the calls were being made. Appellee contended
that this separation was in violation of rule 9.66 of the Kentucky Rules
of Criminal Procedure [hereinafter referred to as RCr].8 This
decision helped clarify prevailing Kentucky law. In two previous
79 Commonwealth v. Brinkley, 362 S.W.2d 494, 497 (1962). See also
Wright v. State, 38 Ala. App. 64, 79 So. 2d 66 (1954).
80 368 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1963).
81Patterson v. Commonwealth, 252 Ky. 285, 66 S.W.2d 513 (1983); 79
C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 17 (1952).
82 284 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1955).
83 366 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1963).
84 Ky. R. Crim. P. § 9.66 thereinafter cited as RCr] provides in part: "If
the offense charged is punishable either by life imprisonment or by death, the
jurors shall be kept together in charge of the proper officer. They may be
permitted to separate only by agreement of the parties and with approval of the
court."
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cases,85 the practice of permitting a juror to hold a conversation over
the telephone when the officer could hear what was said to the juror
had been condemned. The court distinguished these cases on the
ground that here the officer who had heard the conversations of the
jurors and could testify that they made no mention of the case, and
this afforded the protection missing in previous cases.
The court, in Martin v. Commonwealth,"8 involved the general
rule that a conviction of a Negro will be reversed where, at the term
of court in which defendant was tried and for many years previous,
there had been a planned exclusion of Negroes from jury service.8 7
In the Martin case, three Negroes had been called as jurors for the
term at which defendant was tried. None of the Negroes served on
defendant's jury, though two of them performed jury service during
the term. The court held that even though no Negroes were called
for defendant's trial, there was no systematic exclusion of Negroes
which would amount to a denial of defendant's equal right to pro-
tection of the law.
In Price v. Commonwealth,s8 the judge selected the petit jury in
the vault of the clerk's office more than a month after the preceding
term. The court held that there was insufficient compliance with KRS
29.135, which provides that at each term a judge must draw the
names of jurors for the succeeding term. The Price case restated the
law in order to establish clear guidelines in an area where previously
the cases and the statutes had not been helpful. The court set down
the following precise steps for the selection of jurymen: (1) the
judge, during a regular term, is to draw names from the wheel at a
regular session on a juridical day to compose the list of jurors for the
next term; (2) the court is to be opened in a ritualistic manner; (3)
the drawing should be preferably in the presence of the sheriff or
clerk and should be in open court; and (4) the drawing should be
done in a place which is at least temporarily devoted to use as a
courtroom, if not in the courtroom itself.
F. WArvE OF JUBIDICrIoN
In Prather v. Commonwealth,9 the court ruled that a release by
state officials to federal authorities of one who is under arrest, but who
8 5 Canter v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 371, 231 S.W.2d 30 (1950); Wells v.
Commonwealth, 176 Ky. 360, 195 S.W. 825 (1917).
80 8361 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962).
87 Gilchrist v. Commonwealth, 311 Ky. 230, 223 S.W.2d 880 (1949).
98 366 S.W.2d 725 (Ky. 1963). Bain v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.2d 612
(1940); Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 130 S.W.2d 764 (1939).
89 368 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1963).
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had not yet been indicted or convicted, did not constitute waiver of
the right to indict and prosecute for the state offense. Defendant was
arrested by state officials and charged with carrying a deadly weapon
and possessing burglary tools. He was released to federal authorities
on a charge of transporting a stolen car in interstate commerce.
Defendant was re-arrested, tried, and convicted by the state after the
federal authorities had released him on bond. It had been held that
where the defendant was already serving a prison term, his release to
federal authorities constituted a forfeit of Kentucky's right to com-
plete the execution of the state court sentence. 0 However, the precise
question had never before been ruld upon. The Prather decision is
consistent with federal law.
91
G. TRIAL POEnocxr AND EVIDENCE
In Smith v. Commonwealth,92 the court restated Kentucky's rule
that in general all evidence which is pertinent to the issue and tends
to prove the crime is admissible, even though it may also prove or
tend to prove the commission of another crime by the defendant. 93
In this case the admitted evidence tended to prove that the defendant
had acquired the gun in question in a previous crime. The court said
tha tthe evidence was admissible because it tended to show de-
fendant's possession of a fatal weapon with a design to use it to get
money by force.
In Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 4 the court was concerned with
the impeachment of a felon under CR 48.07.95 The defendant had
been convicted of a felony but his sentence and the entering of
judgment was postponed and the defendant had been placed on
probation. The court held that if the one to be impeached has had a
verdict rendered against him or has pleaded guilty, a sentence need
not be imposed in order for the impeachment to be attempted. The
court reasoned that the purpose of impeachment was not to show the
extent or nature of the punishment imposed but to show the character
90 Davis v. Harris, 855 S.W.2d 147 (Ky. 1962); Jones v. Rayborn, 846
S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1961).
91Wernty v. Looney, 208 F.2d 102 (10th Cir. 1953).92366 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1968).
93 Martin v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962); Sheppard v.
Commonwealth, 322 S.W.2d 115 (Ky. 1959).
94 365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1968).
95 Ky. R. Civ. P. § 43.07 [hereinafter cited as CR] provides that a witness
may be impeached where it can be shown by a record of judgment or examination
of a witness that he has been convicted of a felony.
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of the defendant. Kentucky had decisions skirting around this precise
question but none directly in point. In Foure v. Commonwealth,0
the court held that a conviction which was being appealed could not
be used for impeachment. It has also been held that a prior felony
conviction in which the defendant had served time could be used for
impeachment purposes.97 In addition, where a defendant had been
charged and acquitted, the charge was not admissible for purposes
of impeachment.98
In McGill v. Commonwealth,99 a homicide prosecution, the de-
fendant's daughter testified that, on the day of the killing, the
defendant had stated that he had an urge to kill, that he would kill
someone before the sun went down, that he had killed one man
already, that it did not bother him and that it would not hurt him one
bit if he killed another. The court held that this evidence was
competent to show an evil motive and was not excludable as evidence
of another act of homicide. The court reasoned that the testimony
tended to prove defendant's state of mind-the intent to commit the
homicide. This decision helped clarify the general rule which was
formulated in several previous cases.100 In one of those cases, Jackson
v. Commonwealth,'0i the court reversed a voluntary manslaughter
conviction on the ground that a witness could not testify to defendant's
wife's statement after the shooting that defendant was having one
of his crazy spells like he had some time before when he shot her.
Also, in Powell v. Commonwealth,0 2 the court considered the witness's
quotation from defendant as saying he had been in the "pen" and had
deserted from the army reversible error.
In Martin v. Commonwealth,03 the court ruled that when two or
more defendants are jointly indicted for the same offense and severance
is obtained for separate trials, the counsel who had previously
defended one of the accused may assist in the prosecution of the
other if there was no attorney-client relationship with the other.
This question was unique in Kentucky law.
96 214 Ky. 620, 283 S.W. 958 (1926).
97Bond v. Commonwealth, 236 Ky. 472, 33 S.W.2d 320 (1931); Morgan v.
Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 2117, 72 S.W. 1098 (1908).98 Tickey v. Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 570, 215 S.W. 431 (1919); Stewart v.
Commonwealth, 185 Ky. 34, 213 S.W. 185 (1919).
99 865 S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1963).
100 Holt v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1962); Lee v. Common-
wealth, 242 S.W.2d 984 (Ky. 1961); Miller v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 69, 205
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1947).
101 296 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1956).
102 308 Ky. 467, 214 S.W.2d 1002 (Ky. 1948).
103 361 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. 1962).
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H. ANu-SWEA=TG Acr
Bauer v. Commonwealth,'"° reiterated Kentucky's prior interpreta-
tion'0 5 of the import of KRS 422.110, which provides in part, "no ...
person having lawful custody of any person charged with crime, shall
attempt to obtain information from the accused ... by plying him
with questions, or extort information to be used against him on his
trial by threats or other wrongful means.... The court ruled that
questioning at length without evidence of accompanying threats or
coercion will not alone invalidate a confession. The court reasoned
that it is not the extent of the questioning which is prohibited but
the manner in which questioning is conducted. Although there is no
federal anti-sweating statute, federal decisions as to the admissibility
of confessions is consonant with the Bauer decision.
100
104 364 S.W.2d 655 (Ky. 1963).
105 McClain v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 359, 144 S.W.2d 816 (1940).
-06 Duncan v. United States, 197 F.2d 935 (1952); Pierce v. United States,
197 F.2d 189 (1952); Martin v. Murphy, 187 F. Supp. 395 (D.C.N.Y. 1960).
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS
A. MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS
Although there were several cases decided last term which con-
cerned municipal corporations, most of them involved specific ordi-
nances and statutes governing the various classes of cities. Conse-
quently, these decisions were generally limited to statutory construc-
tion and the holdings were somewhat narrow.
1. Annexation
The court of appeals decided three cases dealing with annexation
by a municipal corporation during the last term. Each case concerned
different aspects of the problem. One case involved the procedure of
annexation, one was concerned with a method of establishing a fire
protection district, and the third dealt with the validity of an
annexation for tax purposes.
In Buchanan v. City of Dayton,10' the court upheld the institution
of annexation proceedings by a fourth class city, although a previous
remonstrance suit covering a portion of the same property was
pending. Since the previous suit was dismissed after the filing of the
subsequent action, but before the latter complaint had been attacked
on this ground, there was no bar to completion of the new annexation
proceedings. The court distinguished Garner v. City of Lexington,08
which involved a second class city governed by a different statute.
In the Garner case, Lexington had enacted an ordinance proposing
to annex a one-owner portion of property involved in existing litigation.
The court ruled that the new proceeding could not take place inde-
pendently of the first action in the circuit court and thereby circumvent
its jurisdiction. In the Buchanan case, both proceedings were in the
circuit court.
The Buchanan case has extended a suggestion made in City of
Greenville v. Gossett'0 9 to a clear holding that, when a fourth class city
has proved a prima facie case of substantial benefit to the property
proposed to be annexed, the burden of proof is shifted to the
remonstrants, even though they comprise a substantial majority of
the resident voters.
A novel method of establishing a workable fire protection district
was given approval in Kelly v. Dailey.'" The first step included a
successful proceeding setting up a fire protection district embracing
107 868 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1962).
308 306 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1957).
109 855 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1962).
10 366 S.W.2d 181 (Ky. 1962).
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one-half square mile on the petition of twenty-four resident voters in
accordance with KRS 75.010. This statute authorizes such establish-
ment on petition of fifty-one per cent of the voters residing within the
proposed boundaries. Two weeks later the newly established district
brought suit to annex an additional four and one-half square mile
area. Although several hundred freeholders remonstrated, they com-
prised less than fifty-one per cent of the freeholders and thus there
was no statutory provision for a hearing on the merits. If the whole
five square mile area had been included in the original action to
establish a fire protection district, fifty-one per cent of the resident
voters would have had to sign a petition for the plan to be successful.
The court recognized the scheme, but, after stating that a fire protec-
tion district was a type of municipal corporation, declared that the
fixing of boundaries was a legislative function and that KRS 75.020
authorized the procedure used.
The court of appeals, in City of St. Matthews v. Harrison,'"'
reaffirmed the rule that only property situated within the corporate
limits of the city on assessment date can be subject to imposition of
ad valorem taxes by the city. Louisville, by ordinance, had annexed
the territory involved on April 1, 1957, the assessment date. Although
the City of St. Matthews received a declaratory judgment decreeing
this annexation ordinance void on May 31, 1957, this judgment was
reversed on appeal."12 Louisville, therefore, had both de jure and de
facto jurisdiction over the territory involved on April 1, 1957, and also
on April 1, 1958, the two assessment dates in question.
2. Ordinances
The court of appeals was asked to decide the validity of three
municipal ordinances during the last year. There was no apparent
interrelation among the three decisions, each having wholly distinct
factual bases.
In City of Middlesboro v. Crubbs,'" the court reversed a circuit
court decision which had invalidated a city ordinance establishing a
merit system for the police department. The validity of the ordinance
was attacked by six police officers, and the lower court found the
plaintiffs to be deprived of vested rights in rank and seniority. The
Middlesboro police department had been operating under a previous
ordinance which provided no system for determining rank and
mentioned nothing about seniority. The new ordinance abolished all
ranks except that of chief and placed personnel in a grade which
I869 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. 1968).
112 City of Louisvile v. City of St. Matthews, 816 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1958).
113 868 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1962).
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would raise their salary ten dollars per month. The court of appeals
reviewed the applicable statutes' 14 and held the ordinance was not
objectionable as depriving the police officers of rights of rank and
seniority.
In City of Frankfort v. Triplett,"15 the court struck down a city
ordinance reducing the police court clerk's salary from 275 dollars to
thirty dollars per month, citing this as an arbitrary and unreasonable
abuse of discretion. The electorate of Frankfort adopted the city
manager form of government in 1956. In 1958 the police judge
appointed appellee as clerk of his court. A literal construction of the
statute under which the city manager form of government is estab-
lished requires the abolishment of all non-elective offices in a second
class city such as Frankfort. 116 The court, however, tempered a literal
construction with public policy and found the clerk's office to be
judicial in nature and without the bounds of the statute.
In Cassidy v. City of Bowling Green,117 the court upheld the con-
stitutional validity of municipal ordinances creating a municipal gar-
bage disposal system, and in so doing declared that to forbid the use
of private facilities and compel residents to use the public system was
within the police power of the municipality. This is a restatement of
a long established rule. One of the series of ordinances provided for
discontinuance of water and sewer services upon failure to pay the
garbage disposal service charge. No constitutional right was found to
be violated by this latter ordinance and the interrelation of the
services was cited in the finding that no arbitrary or unreasonable
methods were used.
3. Bond issues
During the last year, the court decided two cases involving the
validity of municipal bond issues. One case required the specific
construction of a statute and the other was decided more on general
principles.
In Hemlepp v. Aronberg,"1s the court upheld the validity of
refunding Ashland school district revenue bonds in advance of the
redemption date. The original issue was sold in 1960 and carried an
interest rate of four and one-quarter to three and three-quarter per
cent. The bonds were non-callable until March 1, 1965. The refunding
bonds carried an interest rate of three and three-quarter per cent,
114 KRS 95.430, 95.440-470.
113 365 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. 1963).
116 KRS 89.420.
117 368 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1963).
118 369 S.W.2d 121 (Ky. 1963).
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which demonstrated the economic feasibility of the plan. An approxi-
mate saving of 75,000 dollars was expected, although the principal
amount of the proposed refunding issue was to exceed the principal
amount owing, due mainly to the eighteen month period between the
issuance of refunding bonds and the redemption of the original issue.
Heretofore, the well-settled rule in Kentucky had been that the
amount of the refunding bond issue should not exceed the outstanding
obligations of the original issue. The court, however, found this rule
was not applicable when the bonds were revenue bonds. This plan
of refunding revenue bonds in advance of the redemption date was a
case of first impression in Kentucky. In distinguishing the refunding
of revenue bonds, the court cited Florida cases approving similar
proposals. 119
A project for the acquisition of an industrial plant to be financed
by city revenue bonds and using the progress-payment plan was held
valid in Gregory v. City of Lewisport.120 To pay construction costs in
stages as work progressed was within the contemplation of the statute
authorizing the city to acquire an industrial building either by pur-
chase or construction.'-" The amount of the proposed bond issue was
50 million dollars. Since the bank named as agent or trustee must
have a combined capital and surplus of an amount greater than the
value of the bonds, an out-of-state bank was required. The court
found no statutory prohibition of designating a non-Kentucky bank to
act in this capacity.
4. License taxes
The court decided ony one case last year having to do with a
license tax imposed by a municipal corporation. In City of Georgetown
v. Morrison,'2 a city ordinance levying a motor vehicle license tax
was held not to apply to a sheriff's car which privately owned, but was
operated solely in performance of official duties. The automobile was
owned jointly by the sheriff and his two deputies and registered in
the name of the "Sheriff of Scott County." When not used in per-
forming official duties, the car was parked at the side of the county
courthouse. The court pointed out that a municipal government is not
an independent body but rather an agent of the Commonwealth
property located within its boundaries. Another automobile owned
by a non-resident of the city which was operated only temporarily
119 State v. Jacksonville Expressway Authority 93 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 1957);
State v. City of Melbourne, 93 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1957).
120 369 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1963).
3
2 '1 KRS 108.210.
122 362 S.W.2d 289 (Ky. 1962).
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within its city limits was also held not to be within the license taxing
authority of the city.
B. CouN=ms
1. Fiscal courts
The court decided two cases having to do with the operation of
county fiscal courts last year. The scope of authority of county fiscal
courts was broadened by the court when it held that the purchase of a
steamboat from the general county fund by a fiscal court was valid.
123
Additional legal protection was vested in the operations of fiscal courts
by a judgment that in a contract between a county fiscal court and an
architect which gives the court the right to cancel any time before
detailed drawings are begun, there is an implied obligation on the
part of the architect to give notice before he proceeds with the
drawings.
24
In Boone v. Cook,125 the court affirmed a judgment that the
purchase of a steamboat by a fiscal court was a public project, where
the steamboat was dedicated for use as a recreational facility and
paid for out of the general county fund. The fiscal court was held
to be a governmental agency within the definition set ou tby KRS
58.010(2) and the steamboat was held to be a public project within
the meaning of KRS 58.010(1), which defines a public project "any
... structure... suitable for and intended for use as public property
for public purposes . . ." Therefore, the purchase was held to be
within KRS 58.010 and subsequent sections which, in general provide
that governmental agencies may acquire or develop public projects
and may issue revenue bonds to defray the cost thereof. Previously,
the court had held that a public project had included an auditorium,
a swimming pool and a field house,'126 a city waterworks and a sewer
system,' and a city bus transportation system, 2 8 but none of these
cases involved purchases by a fiscal court.
The court set out a new rule in Hammon v. Jefferson County,'2
holding that where a provision in a contract between a county fiscal
court and an architect gives the court the right to cancel any time
before detailed drawings are begun, there is an implied obligation on
the part of the architect to give notice before he proceeds with the
drawings. The court reasoned that the architect would otherwise
123 Boone v. Cook, 365 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1963).
124 Hammon v. Jefferson County, 364 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1963).
125 365 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1963).
12 6 McKinney v. City of Owensboro, 305 Ky. 253, 203 S.W.2d 24 (1947).
127 Dunn v. City of Murray, 306 Ky. 426, 208 S.W.2d 309 (1948).
128 Chrisman v. Cumberland Coach Lines, 249 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1952).
29 64 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1963).
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have had the advantage of being able to cut off the fiscal court's right
to cancel whenever he so desired and thus defeat the purpose of the
clause, which was to give the court the power to cancel the contract
before substantial work had been begun by the architect.
2. Maximum indebtedness
The court decided one case last year construing section 158 of the
Kentucky Constitution which contains a maximum debt limitation
on counties. In Miller v. County of Breckinridge,130 the county pro-
posed a bond issue, the purpose of which was to comply with the
provisions of the Hill-Burton Act and qualify for federal aid in the
construction of a new hospital. The bond issue was contested on the
ground that it would cause the county to exceed its normal debt
limitations. The trial court found that hospital facilities in the county
were grossly inadequate. In affirming the judgment that the bond
issue was valid, the court held that this situation was an "emergency,"
as defined in section 158. Therefore, the county was allowed to exceed
its normal debt limitations. This question as to hospitals was novel,
but the emergency rule had been applied to other situations of county
indebtedness and the extension in this case was apparently within the
intent of the rule.
C. SCHOOLS AND SC-OOL DisTmicrs
1. Votes of property owners
During the last term the court had occasion to decide one case
determining who was entitled to vote to change a school district. In
Campbell County Board of Education v. Boulevard Enterprises, Inc., 31
the question was whether a husband and wife who owned real estate
as tenants by the entirety were both owners within the meaning of
KRS 160.045 and consequently whether both were entitled to vote for
a change in the school district.
Prior to 1956, when this case arose, KRS 160.045(2) provided that
if seventy-five per cent of the owners of real property located in a
county school district present a written petition to the board of
education of the school district in which their property is located
demanding that their property be placed in another school district,
the board shall proceed at once to place the property in the school
district as demanded by the petitioners. The court held that both the
husband and wife were entitled to vote because they were both owners
of property within the meaning of the statute. The case, however, is
130 861 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1962).
131 360 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. 1962).
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dated because KRS 160.045 as amended in 1956 allows registered
voters or property owners to have a vote on a change of a school
district.
2. County board of education
Two cases were before the court last year dealing with statutory
requirements of members of or candidates for county boards of
education. One case was concerned with a required oath for members
and another dealt with the requirements of a nominating petition of
a county board candidate. An additional case dealt with the power
of a board to dismiss its counsel. In Commonwealth v. Marshall,
132
the court held that an innocent and an inadvertent omission of a
public school officer to take an oath prescribed by statute does not
authorize his removal from office when he had taken the oath required
by section 228 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The Commonwealth relied on KRS 62.010(1), which provides that
no officer shall enter upon the duties of his office unless he takes the
oath required of him by law. KRS 62.990 makes the violation of
62.010(1) a misdemeanor upon conviction of which the offender is to
be "removed from office." Additionally, KRS 160.170 provides that
every person elected to a board of education "shall before assuming
the duties of his office" take both the Constitutional oath and the
statutory oath set forth therein.
The court, in reaching a decision for the defendant, noted that,
since most laws are supposed to reflect the public well, it is necessary
and proper that they be given a construction which is likely to be
regarded by the public as reasonable and that to require one who had
innocently and inadvertently omitted to take the statutory oath after
having taken the constitutional oath to forfeit his office would be
unreasonable in the eyes of the public.
In Huie v. Jones,133 the court was faced with an action to enjoin a
county clerk from placing the defendant's name on a ballot as a
candidate for membership on the county board of education. The
plaintiff had challenged three signers of a nominating petition for
failure to show a place of residence. One signer was challenged as
not being a legal voter and six signers were alleged to have signed
two petitions. KRS 160.220 provides that the nominating petition for
membership of a board of education shall be signed by not less than
fifty qualified legal voters of the district, and that the place of
residence of each person signing shall be shown. The court held
132 861 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. 1962).
233 362 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1962).
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that a statutory requirement that a petition show the place of residence
of each signer is mandatory, and that persons who do not show a
place of residence are not proper signers. This was a reaffrmance of
the rule.
13 4
The court also held in the Huie case that where signers of a
petition signed more than one petition, the petition filed first is valid
and is not rendered invalid when the signers sign a second petition.
This again affirmed the existing rule.
135
In Hobson v. Howard,13 the court held that where a county board
of education was only one of an attorney's many clients, the attorney
was an independent contractor rather than a public school employee
within the meaning of KRS 160.380, and that he may be discharged
from employment as counsel after filing a suit against the board.
The court noted that there a presumption that a professional man is
an independent contractor and that the court could take judicial
notice of the fact that the board was only one of the appellant's many
clients.la7
3. Equal educational opportunities
During the year, the court was faced with one decision regarding
equal educational opportunities. In Wooley v. Spalding,'38 the court
held that where a court order required the county school district to
maintain equal educational facilities for all children of that district,
and either to maintain a regional high school system and re-establish
a high school or to establish a central high school system, a proposal
to improve and expand an existing city high school and maintain one
of two schools in the western part of the county with equality of
programs, curricula, facilities, and expenditures of funds was accept-
able.
D. AiSmsTRTIE AGENCIES
Seven cases arose during the last term which concerned the scope
of operations of state administrative agencies and the limitations of the
courts on appeals from their decisions.
1. Public service commission
In the first case of Kentucky Utilities Company v. Farmers Rural
Electric Co-op.,3 9 the court held that where the appellee brought suit
134 Bogie v. Hill, 286 Ky. 732, 151 S.W.2d 765 (1941).
'35 Huff v. Black, 259 Ky. 550, 82 S.W.2d 473 (1935).
136 367 S.W.2d 249 (Ky. 1962).
137 New Independent Tobacco Warehouse No. 3 v. Latham, 282 S.W.2d 846
(Ky. 1955).
138 365 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1963).
'39 361 S.W.2d 300 (Ky. 1962).
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attacking the ruling of the commission but failed to make the com-
mission a party to the action until forty-two days had elapsed, the
action should have been dismissed due to a failure to comply with
KRS 278.410 which provides that "any utility affected by an order of
the Commission may within twenty days after being served with the
order ... bring an action against the Commission." The fact that the
suit was instituted against appellant within twenty days after the
order was served was deemed insufficient to meet the requirements
of the statute.
The second case between the same parties challenged the com-
mission's order allowing the appellant to serve a subdivision where
appellant had been so doing long before the subdivision was created,
but where appellee also had lines running through the area.140 The
contention that such an order would provide for duplication of
facilities was sustained by the circuit court. The court of appeals
reversed, holding that although there must of necessity have been
some duplication, there was no showing that the decision of the
commission was either unlawful or unreasonable and that, therefore,
it should not have been overruled. This case indicates the wide
discretion the commission is given in its decisions.
2. Department of agriculture
In Spillman v. Beauchamp,'41 the court upheld the statutory
authority of the department of agriculture to order the destruction of
diseased animals.142 The court stated that the officers could not be
held personally liable even if it should be proven that the animal was
not in fact diseased, as long as they did not act in a willful and
malicious defiance of the veterinarian's diagnosis. Both holdings seem
to be in accord with an earlier Kentucky decision143 and the general
rule.144 This is another illustration of the wide discretion an adminis-
tration agency is given in its operations.
3. Department of welfare
In Fowler v. Black,145 a prisoner in the Kentucky State Reformatory
brought suit against the director of the bureau of corrections, acting
under the authority of the department of welfare, to have rescinded
a penalty imposed for a violation of prison regulations. The penalty
140 Kentucky Util. Co. v. Farmers Rural Electric Coop. Corp., 362 S.W.2d
498 (Ky. 1962).
141 862 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1962).
142 See KRS 44.070-160, 246.210, 257.020, 257.030, and 257.110.
'43 Schneider and Son v. Watt, 252 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1952).
144 67 C.J.S. Parties § 125 (1950).
145 64 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1963).
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consisted of a revocation of accumulated credit on his sentence and a
denial of the privilege of earning any further credit. The court held
that the privilege was a conditional gratuity rather than a vested right
and that therefore it could be forfeited by the prisoner's misconduct.
4. Alcoholic beverage control board
In the case of Durbin v. Wood,146 the court reversed an order of
the alcoholic beverage control board, upheld by the circuit court,
which granted appellee's application for a liquor license when the
required published notice describing the premises read, "Ben Wood,
No. 2, Boaz, Kentucky." The court based its holding on KRS
243.360(1), which requires that the notice state "the location of the
premises for which the license is sought." The purpose of that statute
is to notify the public of the proposed use of specific property so that
any member of the public is afforded an opportunity to file a protest
against the issuance of a license for that location. Therefore, the
court in following the interpretation of an earlier case, 147 held that
the notice was insufficient. Two supplementary questions of interest
were also answered. The first was whether a subsequent notice,
published after application for the license, will cure the inadequacy
of the original notice. The court held that it will not because KRS
248.360(1) provides that an applicant must publish his notice before
applying for a license. The other question was whether insufficiency
of notice is waived by the failure to raise the question before the
board. It was held not to be waived because the fulfillment of the
notice requirement is a condition of eligibility which is made man-
datory by the provisions of KRS 243.450.
In Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Woosley, 1 48 the court
reversed the circuit court and reinstated the board's order denying
appellee's application for a liquor license because of other liquor
outlets in the area, even though he had complied with regulations
which would qualify him for the license. The basis of the decision
was that the issuance would not be in the public interest, and that
KRS 243.450(2) gives a state administrator the authority to deny an
application which might otherwise be issued "for any reason which
he, in the exercise of his sound discretion, may deem sufficient." In
this case, there were two other liquor outlets in the vicinity which
adequately served the immediate area and the premises to be licensed
were close to two churches and other public areas frequented by
minors.
146369 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1963).
' 47 Barnett v. Portwood, 328 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1959).
148367 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1963).
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5. Board of claimas
In Kentucky State Fair Board v. Nicklies,'149 the court dealt with
the general question of the power of the circuit court on appeal from
a decision of the board of claims. In this case, the board had found
that the paved area on which the claimant fell was not negligently
designed or constructed and refused to allow the claim. The circuit
court awarded damages for the claim. The court of appeals reversed,
stating that appeals to the circuit court are governed by KRS 44.140(2)
which limits the powers on appeal to remanding the case to the board
if the circuit court holds the finding erroneous. Additionally, the
court held that it was the board and not the circuit court which may
make an award in cases within the scope of the statute. This appears
to be the general law applicable to all of the state's administrative
agencies as to discretionary powers and the limitations imposed on
the courlts on appeal.
E. ELECnONS
The court of appeals had occasion to decide four cases last year
pertaining to elections. Three of the cases involved requirements of
voting machines and the fourth dealt with the rules governing
nominating petitions.
1. Voting machines
In Ford v. County of Carlisle,150 a resident brought an action to
enjoin the purchase and use of voting machines on the ground that
they did not comply with the requirement of KRS 125.040(1) that a
voting machine must insure secrecy to the voter. The court held that
the requirement is met even though the machine makes a distin-
guishable sound when a write-in ballot is cast, if the sound would
not always be audible above the normal noises of the voting place.
In addition, the court held that where it takes longer to vote for a
candidate of different parties in a certain voting machine, there is no
material violation of the secrecy requirements of the statute. The court
noted that a straight ticket could always be voted in a few seconds
but a split ticket would naturally take longer, and therefore it would
be unreasonable to hold a voting machine not to be within the
statutory requirements on that ground. The court also held that the
fact that a voting machine could be unlocked and the counters read
to determine who cast the ballot did not violate the statute.
In Mills v. Broughton,151 the plaintiff's majority of votes were
149 861 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1962).
150 861 S.W.2d 757 (Ky. 1962).
51865 S.W.2d 815 (Ky. 1968).
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eliminated when the circuit court decreed that it was impossible to
determine the will of the voters from a certain precinct in an election.
The defendants were declared elected on the grounds that in the
precinct the secrecy requirements set out in section 147 of the Ken-
tucky Constitution and KRS 125.140(2) were violated. KRS 125.140(2)
provides:
No voter shall be permitted to receive an assistance in voting unless
he makes and signs an oath that by reason of inability to read English
... he is unable to vote without assistance....
In the precinct in question fifty per cent of all the voters were given
aid by precinct judges in using the voting machines, and none of the
voters made or signed the required oath. It was impossible for the
trial court to determine for whom any of the votes were cast.
The court held that the signing of the oath is mandatory under
KRS 125.140(2) and votes cast with assistance are illegal under the
statute unless the oath is signed. This was the first ruling on the
section, but it conformed in substance with KRS 118.300(1) pertaining
to illiterates voting by ballot where failure to take the prescribed
oath rendered the vote invalid.
Under KRS 122.040(4), the court may find that there has been no
election only if it appears from the whole record that there has been
such fraud, intimidation, bribery or violence that there could have
been no fair election. The holding in the Mills case is consistent with
this statute since in an earlier case construing this statute, the court
held that if it has been established that a large proportion of the votes
cast were illegal, and it is not possible to detemrine how the votes
were cast the election will nevertheless be voided. 52
In Lackey v. Garner,5 the court ruled on the constitutionality of
KRS 118.450(4), which requires each county to acquire voting ma-
chines for each precinct in which such machines are not already in
use. Section 147 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that counties
so desiring may use voting machines. The trial court construed the
words of the constitution as prohibiting mandatory use of voting
machines. In reversing the trial court's decision, the court of appeals
changed the construction of the word "may" and ruled that the
Constitution's use of the word "may" does not render unconstitutional
mandatory legislation. This expressly overruled an earlier decision to
the contrary.15
4
152 Napier v. Noplis, 318 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1958).
1533 67 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1963).
154 Billiter v. Nelson, 300 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. 1957).
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2. Nominating petitions
The only other decision by the court last year pertaining to elec-
tions dealt with nominating petitions.
In Carter v. Henrickson'55 there was involved a nominating
petition which stated that a certain person was nominated as candidate
for "Office of the U. S. Congress," and the names of citizens from
counties within the congressional district. The court held this was
sufficient to identify the House of Representatives and the district to
be represented. This was a reaffirmation of the general rule that
courts will construe election statutes liberally in favor of citizens
whose right to choose their public officers is challenged.156 This rule
is complemented by another rule of construction which provides that
a good faith purpose to nominate a candidate for public office should
be recognized unless the plain or manifest purpose of the law demands
a decision invalidating the petition.
157
F. PuBrc OmLCIs
1. Compensation
The court of appeals last year had occasion to decide two cases
involving the compensation of public officials. One case dealt with
the compensation of justices of the peace and the other with the
compensation of county attorneys.
In Webster County v. Nance,158 the fiscal court had not placed a
limitation upon the compensation for magistrates. The defendant
magistrate had an average of 1,448 cases yearly, and in the year in
question most defendants pleaded guilty to the charge of breach of
peace and were fined one dollar and court costs, which were assessed
at 20.50 dollars in each case. The number of cases before the
defendant magistrate multiplied by his share of the court costs greatly
exceeded the 5,000 dollar statutory compensation he was allowed.159
The court of appeals held that where the fiscal court had not
placed a limitation in a certain term upon the compensation for
magistrates and justices of the peace, the maximum compensation was
that which had been fixed previously, before the term of office began.
In Webster County v. Vaughn,160 there was involved an action to
recover from a former county attorney sums received by him as fees
in traffic cases in a magistrate's court where the county attorney did
'55 361 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1962).
156 Queenan v. Mimms, 283 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1955).
157 See KRS 120.060, 118.080(2).
158 362 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. 1962).
159 See KRS 64.700; Upton v. Whitley County, 256 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1953).
100 365 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1963).
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not appear in any of the cases. The court of appeals held that a
county attorney is not entitled to collect fees as court costs of cases
in magistrates court when he was not present and took no part in the
prosecution of the traffic offenders. The court applied KRS 64.410(2)
which prescribes that no officer shall demand or receive any fee for
services not actually rendered.
2. Duties of an officer
In Raney v. Stovalllr1 Raney was appointed a deputy sheriff
while he was serving a four-year term in the Kentucky Senate under
a permissible construction of section 165 of the Kentucky Constitution,
KRS 61.080 and 61.090. It was charged that the offices of senator and
deputy sheriff are incompatible and the acceptance of the second
office vacated the first. The senate, however, passed a resolution
recognizing Raney as a duly qualified senator and the commissioner
of finance issued warrants covering compensation and allowances as
a senator during the period he held both offices.
The appellee state treasurer refused to honor the warrants and suit
was brought to compel her to do so and to enjoin her from refusing
to honor future warrants properly presented. The court held that the
state treasurer is not required to honor any warrant issued by the
department of finance. She may properly, acting in good faith and
upon substantial constitutional grounds, raise the question for judicial
determination concerning the legality of a warrant.
161361 S.W.2d 518 (Ky. 1962).
IV. TAXATION
Of note during the past term was the interpretation of three of
Kentucky tax statutes. In Marcum v. Kentucky Enterprise Federal
Savings & Loan Association,'62 the court decided that the liability for
the annual tax of one dollar on each 1,000 dollars of paid-in capital
stock of building and loan associations imposed by KRS 136.300 is
upon the association and not its stockholders. In granting the stock-
holders immunity to liability for the tax, the court reasoned that there
was nothing to indicate that the stockholders should be liable for the
tax, as would be the case if the association was merely a collecting
agency for them, and concluded that the decision in an earlier supreme
court case should be followed.
163
In James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Department of Rev-
enue,164 the court held that whiskey purchased in a foreign country
and stored in Kentucky in its "original package" without being sold
or used by the purchaser cannot be taxed under KRS 243.680(2).
This statute requires anyone who ships or transports distilled spirits
into the state to secure a permit to do so and to pay a ten cents per
gallon tax thereon. Plaintiff complied with the statute and paid the
tax levied against the whiskey, but subsequently brought this action
for a refund of the taxes paid, on the ground that the transaction
could not be validly taxed under the constitution. The contention was
upheld on the ground that the whiskey was an "import" within the
"export-import" clause of the United States Constitution'65 and there-
fore was immune to tax in view of the decision in Brown v. Mary-
land.166 In that case, the Supreme Court held that goods imported
into a state in their "original package" could not be constitutionally
taxed. In answer to the contention that the levy was a license tax and
not a tax upon the "import" itself, the court pointed out that the form
of the tax is not controlling. Since the tax levied was, in fact, a tax
upon an import in its "original package," it violated the constitutional
protection afforded by the Brown case.
Finally, in Marcum v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad
Company,6 7 it was held that a corporation's income was properly
adjusted pursuant to KRS 141.205(5). The corporation operated a
bridge and switching terminal, and all of its shares of stock were
102 363 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1962).
363 Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955).
164 367 S.W.2d 267 (Ky. 1963).
165 U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
16025 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
167 863 S.W.2d 98 (Ky. 1962).
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owned equally by three railroad companies. The three shareholders
agreed that they were to pay for their use of the corporation's
facilities only an amount necessary to meet all expenses and obligations
of the corporation which exceeded revenues earned through use of the
facilities by non-stockholders. KRS 141.205(5) provides, in effect,
that a corporation which carries on transactions with shareholders
shall have its net income adjusted to an amount that would result if
such transactions were carried on at "arms length." The tax depart-
ment levied a deficiency against the corporation after adjusting its
income pursuant to the statute. The court upheld the adjustment,
the method used and the amount assessed. The important aspect of
the case, however, lies in the interpretation placed upon the statute.
The court said, "simply stated the statute means that the department
shall determine the net income of a subject corporation to be an
amount equal to that which it would have received had all of its
business been carried on with strangers." s68 Thus, the case clearly
established that KRS 141.205(5) is mandatory and will be applied
by the department to thwart any scheme devised to avoid income tax
where a corporation transacts business with its shareholders.
168 Id. at 101.
V. INSURANCE
The most interesting case decided during the term was Salisbury
v. Vick.169 The court held that a divorced wife who was the named
beneficiary of her former husband's life insurance policy was not
entitled to its proceeds upon his death even though she had paid
the premiums on the policy subsequent to the divorce. The decision
is the last in a line of cases interpreting KRS 403.060(2) and KRS
403.065 as they relate to a divorced wife's right to the proceeds of an
insurance policy procured by the husband during the marriage. Those
statutes provide that upon a judgment of divorce all property of either
party obtained from or through the other before, during, or in con-
sideration of the marriage should be restored to the appropriate party.
The earliest case decided by the court held that these statutes
abrogated any rights the divorced wife had in a life insurance policy
her husband had procured during the marriage.170 However, two
subsequent decisions limited this rule. In Ficke v. Prudential Life
Insurance Company of America,'71 it was held that if the wife, during
the marriage, procured the policy and paid the premiums, then, even
though there was a subsequent divorce, she was entitled to the
proceeds. Subsequently, in Johnson v. Johnson's Administratrixl7
2
the court held that even though the wife did not procure the policy,
if she paid the premiums on it before and after the divorce then she
was entitled to receive the proceeds.
In the Vick case, the plaintiff argued that while the statutes
abrogated her rights she reinstated her interest in the policy after the
divorce by payment of the premiums until her former husband's
death. The court, in answer to this contention, reaffirmed its first rule
and distinguished the Ficke case on the ground that there the wife
had paid premiums during the marriage, and not just subsequent to
the divorce. No mention was made of the Johnson case. The court
reasoned that since after the divorce the wife was a stranger to the
policy by statute, both established legal principle and policy favored
the conclusion that she could not be allowed to reinstate her interest.
The net effect of the Vick decision is to negate any possible inference
that might have been drawn from the Johnson case that since the wife
was entitled to the proceeds when she paid the premiums before and
after the divorce, she would be entitled to the proceeds by mere
payment of the premiums after the divorce.
169 368 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. 1963).
170 Warren v. Cpurlock's Adm'r, 292 Ky. 668, 167 S.W.2d 858 (1948).
171 805 Ky. 171, 202 S.W.2d 429 (1947).
172 297 S.W.2d 753 (Ky. 1944).
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In two other cases the court reaffirmed and applied several well
settled principles of law in Kentucky and other jurisdictions. Home
Insurance Company of New York v. Caudill13 involved an action to
enforce payment under a fire insurance policy where the plaintiffs had
secured the policy through the defendant's local agent, agreeing to
make five installments in payment of the premium. A promissory note
for the total amount due was given. The policy provided that if
there was any default in payment the policy was to be suspended
until the amount due was paid. The plaintiffs defaulted, but after
the local agent demanded payment, with express authority of the
defendant, the overdue installment was paid. Thereafter, the plain-
tiffs' house and barn were destroyed by fire and they filed a claim
for payment under the policy. The defendant denied it on the ground
that the plaintiffs' payment of the overdue installment to the local
agent was not payment to it, and therefore coverage under the policy
was suspended at the time of the fire. The court held that the
installment was paid to the defendant, even though the policy provided
that the installments were payable at the defendant's offices in New
York or Chicago. The defendant's previous course of dealing in
allowing plaintiffs to pay the other installments to the local agent
amounted to a custom or habit which justified them in believing
the payment as made was binding.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Shel-
tonY 4 where an action was brought to enforce a judgment against a
company's insured driver, the court of appeals held that the lower
court erred by refusing to allow the company to present evidence of
fraud and collusion in the previous action. The defendant contended
that the plaintiff had conspired with its insured to make it appear
that the latter was driving the automobile at the time of the accident
when in fact he was not. The basis for the court's award of a new
trial was the recognized exception to the general rule of collateral
estoppel.175 Ordinarily a liability insurer has a right to defend an
action against its insured if it has timely notice, but if it fails to do so
a judgment against the insured is binding upon it as to the issues
litigated.170 However, where fraud or collusion is involved the rule
does not apply, especially where the insured helped perpetrate the
173 366 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1963).
174 368 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1963).
175 Comm'r's of State Ins. Fund v. Lowe, 3 N.Y.2d 590, 148 N.E.2d 136, 170
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1958).
176 5A Am. Jr. Automobile Insurance § 191 (1936).
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fraud.177 Therefore, the court held that the defendant had a right to
raise and prove the defense and it was error to deny it the chance.
Two other cases required the construction of certain words used
in the policies involved in the litigation. In Niagara Fire Insurance
Company v. Curtsinger,'78 the court held that the mere sinking of a
porch floor which pulled it and the porch roof away from the side
of the plaintiff's house was not a "collapse" of the building. There-
fore, there could be no recovery by the plaintiff for a "collapse" of
the house under the policy. However, it was held that the falling
away of land next to the carport of the house, which caused its roof
to sag and pull away from the house, presented a triable issue on
the question of whether this damage was caused by a "landslide" and
therefore compensable under a provision of the policy. The interesting
point of the case was that the court adopted the position that an
insurance company may be liable under a policy protecting against
damage caused by a "landslide" not only where land falls down upon
a building but also where the land slides out from under the
structure1
7 9
Finally, in Bays v. Mahan,8 0 the court concluded that a mother
living in the home of her son, and dependent upon him for support,
was a member of his "immediate family" and thus the son was entitled
to the benefits due under a burial plan insurance contract.
177 Id. at § 189.
178 861 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1962).
179 There was evidence which tended to show that since the house was
paostioned upon a hillside, the damage to the carport could have been caused by
1nd on the side of the hill giving way under the house. Id. at 763.
180 862 S.W.2d 782 (Ky. 1962).
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A. EmmmNT DomAiN
The most significant case decided in the area of condemnation law
during the last term was Commonwealth v. Sherrod.'8' The opinion
patently rejects the old rules by which juries evaluated damages in
condemnation actions and sets forth new rules designed to make courts
and juries adhere strictly to the concept of fair market value. The
state condemned a strip of land which was subject to commercial
lease. The trial court's instructions failed to state that the total
damages payable by the condemnor could not exceed the difference
in fair market value of the entire tract before and after the taking,
and the court of appeals held that this failure constituted reversible
error under existing case law. 82
The court went on, however, to reevaluate and change the entire
system of assessing the award to the landowner whose land is taken
under the state's power of eminent domain. The problem of determin-
ing and allocating damages where the condemned land is subject to
lease was initially considered. The previous method, as outlined in
City of Ashland v. Price,183 was to first determine the value of the
lease to the lessee by ascertaining the present fair rental value, com-
paring that with the rent stipulated in the contract, and allowing the
lessee damages computed by multiplying the difference by the unex-
pired term of the lease. The court said this method was completely
unsound, unfair and unworkable in that it led to deviations from
the rule that the total amount payable by the condemnor cannot be
increased by outside contracts entered into by the condemnee. The
court felt that the method outlined in the Price case led in practice
to juries awarding the lessee damages for the unexpired lease and
then awarding the lessor essentially full damages. 84
The new rules, as set down in the Sherrod case, require a finding
of difference in fair market value before and after the taking before
any consideration is given to the value of the lease. The new instruc-
tions require the jury to find: (1) the fair market value of the tract
as a whole immediately before the taking, giving consideration to
181 367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963).
182 Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 253 S.W.2d 264 (Ky. 1951); Ky. Water
Service Co. v. Bird, 239 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1951).
183 318 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1958).
184 The court pointed out that it is not uncommon for the figure produced
by multiplying the difference in rental value before and after the taking by the
remaining months of the lease to be greater than the figure representing the fair
market value of the property. Commonwealth v. Sherrod, supra note 1, at 848.
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the fact that it has rental value but evaluating it as if free and clear
of the lease; (2) the fair market value of the tract as a whole,
immediately before the taking, if sold subject to the lease; (3) the
fair market value of so much of the leased tract as remains immediately
after the taking, giving consideration to the fact that it has rental
value but evaluating it as if free and clear of the lease. After the jury
has fixed these three values the judge will compute the total damages
payable by subtracting (3) from (1) and allocating this amount
between the lessee and lessor, and subtracting (2) from (1) and
dividing by (1) to arrive at the lessor's percentage of ownership.
Under this method the total damages are computed first and the
value of the lease second. Thus the lessee may be at a disadvantage
because he will not be allocated any damages at all unless a jury
determines that the existence of the lease detracts from the value of
the land to the lessor.
The court noted that its method of evaluation omitted any refer-
ence to the fixing of taking and resulting damages and said that "the
omission is intentional . . . and the conclusion we have reached, for
the reasons hereinafter set forth, is that there should be no separate
determination and fixing of taking and resulting damages in any
condemnation case.... ."15 This changes existing Kentucky case law""'
and renders inoperative certain statutes insofar as they require
separate evaluations. 187 The only criterion is to be the difference in
fair market value before and after the taking and factors which
previously might have received separate evaluation are now to be
received into evidence as affecting the measure of damages.
The court also considered the question of the offsetting of benefits
to the remainder derived from the improvement against the damages
to be awarded the condemnee. Prior Kentucky law on the subject is
illustrated by the recent case of Frenel v. Commonwealth,188 which
stated that benefits may be offset against resulting damages but not
against damages for the taking, the rationalization being that there
is a constitutional right to damages for the taking but only a statutory
right to resulting damages. As the court pointed out in the Sherrod
case, however, the situation was confused by decisions holding that
benefits could not be offset against either taking or resulting dam-
185 Id. at 852.
188Ky. Water Services Co. v. Bird, 239 S.W.2d 66 (Ky. 1951); Common-
wealth v. Combs, 244 Ky. 204, 50 S.W.2d 497 (1932).
187 The railroad condemnation statutes rendered in part inoperative are KRS
416.020 and 416.050. The highway condemnation statutes affected are KRS
177.083 and 177.087. Also affected is KRS 416.110 providing for the separate
fixing of damages for fencing, trees, and shrubbery.
188 331 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1959).
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ages' 8 9 and decisions introducing the concept of "incidental damages"
against which benefits could be offset.'9 0 The court, in a dramatic
and forthright manner, threw out all categorizations as to types of
damage and said that benefits accruing to the remainder because of
the special relationship of the improvement to the remainder could
be offset against the total damages payable to the condemnee. In so
holding, the court followed the reasoning of a Supreme Court decision
that the property of a landowner is a value unit and when part of the
land is taken the only question is how much has the unit been reduced
in value.191 If property is thought of as value, benefits may be offset
against either taking or resulting damages as there is a decrease of
value in either case. If the owner's loss has been mitigated by an
enhancement in the value of the remaining land, it would violate the
constitution to pay him compensation without regard to the enhance-
ment, since this would not be paying the condemnee just compensa-
tion for the value unit taken.
The Sherrod case atly held the statutes192 providing that benefits
may be offset only against resulting damages unconstitutional. The
jury in the future shall determine the difference in the fair market
value of the tract as a whole before and after the taking, giving
consideration to any enhancement in value of the remainder to the
improvement. This is to be distinguished from the enhancement of
property values in the community generally.
The court has already manifested a tendency to extend the prin-
ciples of the Sherrod case. In Gulf Interstate Gas Company v.
Garvin,193 the appellant sought to condemn a pipeline easement
through land subject to a mineral lease. The court held that where
land containing minerals is condemned, the quantity and quality of
the minerals may be properly introduced as affecting the market value
of the tract-surface and minerals, but not as a basis of separate
compensation. The owners of the mineral lease may introduce evi-
dence showing the quantity and quality of the minerals and by the
principles of the Sherrod Case this would increase the total amount
payable by the condemnor and would increase the mineral holder's
percentage of ownership. In practice this method may penalize the
mineral holder as he may prove his damage only indirectly and his
189 Broadway Coal Mining Co. v. Smith, 186 Ky. 725, 125 S.W. 157 (1910);
Asher v. Louisville & N.R.R., 87 Ky. 391, 8 S.W. 854 (1888).
190 East Ky. Rural Elec. Coop. v. Smith, 310 S.W.2d 535 (Ky. 1958);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hargis, 280 Ky. 806, 20 S.W.2d 991 (1929); Music v. Big
Sandy & Ky.R.R., 163 Ky. 628, 174 S.W. 44 (1915).
19 1 Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
192 KRS 177.083, 416.020.
193 $68 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1963).
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share is to be computed only if the jury finds the lease detrimental
to the surface owner. The question of evaluation when the minerals
are owned in fee by one other than the surface owner remains open.
The case of Commonwealth v. Tyree 94 deals definitively with the
admissibility and probative value of opinion evidence as to the fair
market value of the property condemned. Opinion evidence to be
admissible at all must be given by a competent witness. The court,
in the Tyree case, held that, to be competent, a witness must have
knowledge of property values generally and a knowledge of the
particular property involved. The later case of Commonwealth v.
Taylor 95 elaborated on these qualifications and held that ". . . a
witness, to be qualified to testify as to the value of realty, must know
the property in the vicinity, must understand the standard of value,
and must be possessed of the ability to make a reasonable inference."196
The court, in the Tyree case, after roughly defining competency,
,went on to distinguish between competency and relevancy. A witness
may give his opinion as to fair market value without stating what
factors he considered in making his estimate and such an opinion is
both competent and relevant. If, however, on cross-examination, it is
brought out that the witness relied on an irrelevant measure of value
or an element of value that is legally non-compensable, the testimony
may be stricken as irrelevant. The court hinted that the opinion might
be saved on re-direct examination by having the witness recompute
his estimate without the irrelevant factor. The right to consideration
on appeal must, of course, be preserved by a motion to strike at the
trial level.
The concept of limited probative value was introduced into con-
demnation law in the Tyree case. The court stated that evidence of
probative value is evidence having the fitness to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable men, but went on to make it clear that all
competent and relevant opinion evidence, no matter how extravagant,
will be thought of as having some probative value. The lack of
supporting facts for an opinion will detract from the probative value
of that opinion to the extent that contrary opinions are supported by
facts. An unsupported opinion or an opinion patently extravagant
may be capable of conviction up to a certain point but not beyond. A
verdict in accord with extravagant evidence will be set aside as not
supported by the evidence.
194 365 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1963).
195 368 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1963).
196 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 368 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Ky. 1963), citing 32
CJ.S. Evidence § 545 (1942).
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In the case of Commonwealth v. Lyons,1 7 decided prior to the
Tyree case, the court ruled that testimony of the condenmee's witness
that a house, valued at 9,000 dollars before condemnation, was
absolutely worthless after condemnation of a strip of land thirty-two
feet from the house was so contrary to common knowledge as to be
without evidentiary value. By the rule of the Tyree case, such testi-
money would have to be deemed to have some evidntiary value but
as a practical matter it would have so little that a jury could not
return a full verdict or a verdict near the evaluation of the witness.
The change in terminology might effect a change in the rationalization
of the Lyons case but not in the result.
In another decision prior to the Tyree case, Commonwealth v.
Raybourne,98 the court reversed as excessive an award of 6,910 dollars
for damages to the remainder of a farm resulting from the taking of a
strip of land where the residence was to be 600 feet from the highway.
The court stated that since the testimony did not have a reasonable
and valid basis it lacked sufficient probative value to support the
award. By the rules of the Tyree case, however, supporting facts are
necessary to lend probative value to opinion evidence only to the
extent that supporting facts are introduced to support contrary opinion
evidence. Testimony cannot be discounted solely because it is not
supported by specific facts.
The Tyree case has already been cited as controlling authority for
the proposition of limited probative value. The court held, in Com-
monwealth v. Elizabethtown Amusements Inc.,199 that an estimate of
32,000 dollars for a sixty-six foot strip along the front of a drive-in
theatre had probative value, and that an award of 11,700 dollars was
not patently in excess of any amount the evidence reasonably could
sustain.
The question of the admissibility into evidence of property tax
evaluations signed by the condemnee was dealt with in the cases of
Texas Gas and Transmission Company v. Rose2°° and Commonwealth
v. Lanter,20 1 both holding that the exclusion of such evidence consti-
tutes reversible error. This follows the general rule of Commonwealth
v. Rankin.202 As made clear by the Tyree case, however, there is no
requirement that the evaluation be given considerable weight unless
the assessed value bears some reasonable relation to the minimum
197 364 S.W.2d 336 (Ky. 1963).
198 364 S.W.2d 812 (Ky. 1963).
399 367 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1963).
200 865 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1963).
201 364 S.W.2d 652 (Ky. 1963).
202 346 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1960).
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market value as established by other evidence in the ease. There is
no question of estoppel.203 The evaluation, for the purposes of
relevancy, is to be thought of as having been made when the
condemnee last signed the assessment sheet, regardless of when the
county assessor actually made the evaluation.
In Commonwealth v. Eubank,204 evidence tending to show the
productivity of agricultural land was held to be admissible as a
factor affecting fair market value. The court, however, held that it is
not proper to show prior earnings because that would tend to show
the worth of a business as distinct from the worth of the land itself.
In Commonwealth v. McGreorge,205 the court held that evidence
of a comparable sale was not inadmissible merely because the buyer
had the power of eminent domain, despite the theory that evidence
of a comparable sale is inadmissible unless it is between a willing
seller not compelled to sell and a willing buyer not compelled to buy.
In the comparable sale in that case the buyer was the local school
board and it was clear that the board, unlike the department of high-
ways, was not committed by advance plan to the acquisition of certain
pieces of property. Therefore, the court held that whether the
comparable sale was by free choice was a question of fact which should
go to the jury for whatever weight they choose to put on it.
In Commonwealth v. Blackburn,206 the rule was restated that the
condemnee may not receive compensation for enhancements in the
value of the land taken where the enhancement is due to the prospect
of the improvement itself. Likewise, a comparable sale favorably
reflecting the prospect of the improvement should be excluded on
motion. But, the court said, it is incumbent upon the condemnor to
object or move to strike at the trial level to preserve grounds for
appeal. The court in this case was not forced to consider the difficult
question of how the condemnor can prove that a sale has been favor-
ably influenced by the prospect of the improvement.
Three cases decided during the term concerned in some way the
procedure by which the condemnor secures right of entry onto the
condemned property. Commissioners are appointed by the county
court, they inspect the property and make an award, a judgment is
entered in the county court in accord with this award, and the
condemnor pays the amount of the award into the county court. The
date of taking is the date of the entry of the county court judgment.
2 0 3 Commonwealth v. Tyree, 365 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Ky. 1963).
204 369 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1963).
205 369 S.W.2d 126 (Ky. 1963).
200 4 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. 1963).
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All questions as to the right to take are adjudicated in the county,
either the condemnee or the condemnor may appeal the amount of the
commissioner's award to the circuit court and have a jury trial de novo
as to the adequacy of the award.
The condemnee, in the county court, challenged the right of the
department of highways to take his property, alleging fraud, bad faith
and abuse of discretion. The court, in Commonwealth v. Burchett,
207
held that a mere showing that a road could have been routed so as
to miss appellee's property does not support a claim of abuse of
discretion. The public interest demands that the department of
highways be allowed broad discretion in the acquisition of property
and should not be held to the shortest or most economical routes.
The general question of enforcing debts against the state was
considered in the case of Commonwealth v. Circuit Court of Bullit
County.208 Specifically the circuit judge issued a writ of execution
upon property of the department of highways. The lower court issued
an injunction to prevent the levy and this appeal was taken by the
state. The court of appeals held that a writ of execution will not lie
against property owned by the state, and that the proper method of
enforcing debt is to ask the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus
to compel the commissioner of finance to issue a warrant and to
compell the treasurer to pay the warrant.
KRS 177.087, which provides that all appeals from county court
to the circuit shall be taken within thirty days from the entry of
judgment in county court, was construed to be jurisdictional in
nature in the case of Commonwealth v. Berryman.209 An appeal taken
on the thirty-second day was declared void and it was held that the
failure of the opposing party to object in subsequent circuit court
proceedings could not constitute a waiver, as jurisdiction can never
be conferred on a court by the actions of the parties.
An interesting question is presented by the case of Bowling Green-
Warren County Airport Board v. Long,2 10 where the board condemned
a portion of appellee's land to extend a runway. The court held that
the condemnees were entitled to compensation for the contemplated
use of the air space above the remainder, stating that the condemna-
tion of land does not ipso facto include the right to invade the
reasonable air space of adjacent land. The court relied on a Supreme
Court decision because there was no Kentucky case in point.211
207 367 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. 1963).
208 365 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1963).
209 363 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1962).
210 364 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1963).
'211 United States v. Cousby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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Although the Bowling Green Airport case, by its language, seems to
stand for the proposition that one has a property interest in the air
space over his land, it is questionable, however, whether the case,
on its facts, stands for anything more than that in assessing damages
to the remainder, a valid factor for consideration is that airplanes will
be flying at low altitudes over the land and to some extent interfering
with the use and enjoyment of the land. The question remains open:
if one does have a property right in air space as such, how high does
this property right extend?
In Commonwealth v. Carlisle2 12 the court held that the only right
of access that a landowner has is the right of "reasonable access to
the highway system." The access of the landowner is subject to control
under the police power, presumably with a court weighing the
benefit to the landowner against the danger to the traveling public.
The court made it clear that where the department of highways seeks
to limit access it should do so under the police power and not under
the theory of taking of a property interest. If there is a condemnation
as such, the department cannot complain when a jury awards damages
for the taking. The court further held that the appellee was not
entitled to damages for the construction of deceleration and turning
lanes or the placing of traffic dividers between the north and south
lanes. While these may interfere with traffic reaching appellee's
property, the appellee has no compensable interest in the flow of
traffic.
The Carlisle case contains language with broad implications and
presents an open question to the courts. How far can the department
of highways go in limiting access rights under the police power? If
the landowner is entitled only to reasonable access to the highway
system, could the department, on the theory that the travelling public
is endangered by commercial enterprises on major highways, provide
those enterprises with secondary access roads and close certain major
highways to commercial enterprises?
B. DowEa
Only one case of importance concerning dower rights was decided
during the last term. In Walters v. Anderson,21 3 the husband's land
was sold at execution and brought an excess over the amount of the
judgments. The husband then assigned his rights in the excess to his
wife. When the purchaser paid the sale price into court, he attempted
212 363 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1962).
213 361 S.W.2d 31 (Ky. 1962).
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to earmark a portion as value of the wife's inchoate dower right, but
the court temporarily set aside the amount pending adjudication. The
wife, however, upon motion, received the moneys as assignee of her
husband. Upon the husband's death, she asserted her dower right
to the property. The court of appeals, reversing the trial court, held
that as the wife had taken the sale price money without prejudice
to her dower right and had not surrendered that right, then under
the applicable statute, 14 she was not estopped from claiming her
one-third life estate in the land.
This decision affirmed the existing law in Kentucky regarding
dower rights in land sold at execution. The right may, of course,
be relinquished or waived.215 Kentucky has long recognized the rule
that an execution sale does not bar the inchoate dower rights of the
wife,216 and the statute mentioned above is merely a codification of,
and is in harmony with, the common law.217
C. MORTGAGES
The Kentucky court recently construed an old statute in a new
context. In Trio Realty Company v. Queenan,218 plaintiff sought a
declaratory judgment construing the provision of KRS 382.330, which
provides that:
No county clerk shall record a deed or deed of trust or mortgage covering
real property by which the payment of any indebtedness is secured
unless the deed or deed of trust or mortgage states the date and the
maturity of the obligations thereby secured which have been already
issued or which are to be issued forthwith. 19
The plaintiff received a mortgage in consideration of any indebted-
ness which might be incurred by the mortgagor to the mortgagee in
214 KRS 892.020. The pertinent provision is as follows:
After the death of the husband or wife intestate, the survivor shall have
an estate... for his or her life in one-third of any real estate of which
the other spouse . . . was seized of an estate in fee simple during the
coverture but not at the time of death, unless the survivor's right to
such interest has been barred, forfeited or relinquished.
215 Ellis v. Grider, 6 Ky. Opin. 29 (1872) held that where a wife appeared
in court and relinquished her dower right in her husband's land sold at a com-
missioner's sale, she was thereby estopped from asserting this claim against the
purchaser. See generally, 28 C.J.S. Dower § 51 (1941).
216 Robinson v. Robinson, 74 Ky. 174 (1874), held that a purchaser takes
subject to the widow's dower interest even though the judgment directing the
sale of the land fails to mention that the land is subject to dower interests. See
also, Fields' Heirs v. Napier, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 240, 80 S.W. 1110 (1904); Vinson
v. Gentry, 14 Ky. L. Rep. 804, 21 S.W. 578 (1893).
217 C.J.S., op. cit supra note 3, at § 61.
218 860 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1962).
219 Originally enacted in 1926, Ky. Stat. § 511a-1 (1926), reenacted in Ky.
Acts c. 83, § 17 (1962).
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the future, up to a stated limit. The instrument purported to be a
"continuing pledge" of the real estate and was to remain in full force
and effect until released of record by the mortgagee. 220 When the
plaintiff sought to have the mortgage recorded, the county court clerk
refused to record it in absence of the date and maturity of the
obligation of the security, as required by the statute.
The court pointed out that, while the purpose of the statute was
unclear, the purpose appeared to be to protect a mortgagor or lien
holder rather than prospective purchasers as in most recording
statutes.221 The court speculated that the statute may have been
enacted to prevent unscrupulous persons from gaining a stranglehold
on property by recording an encumbrance with undefined limits and
thereby prevent the mortgagor from using the property for further
security. The conclusion reached by the court was that where a valid
mortgage fails to reveal the date and maturity of the obligation, the
instrument is not recordable.
D. CANCELLATION OF A DEE
In Sanders v. Needy,222 the plaintiff, a widow, lived with her
daughter and son-in-law in a home owned by the plaintiff. She
deeded an interest in this and other property to them in consideration
for their promise to furnish her with a home during her lifetime. They
built a house upon the lot and invited the plaintiff to move. She
refused and brought suit for cancellation of the deeds on the ground
that there was a partial failure of consideration. The court of appeals
held that a deed should not be cancelled where the parties cannot
be restored to their former position due to the passage of time since
execution of the deed, and where the defendant has so substantially
changed its position by making improvements on the land.
This holding repeats the established doctrine that, in the absence
of fraud, a court of equity will not cancel a deed for partial failure of
consideration 3 The majority rule, however, is that where a grantee
refused or fails to perform his promise to support the grantor, such is
a ground for cancellation. 22 4 But in the Sanders case, the defendants
were willing to perform their obligations and even give more than an
adequate contribution toward the plaintiff's support. The case, there-
fore, merely affirms existing Kentucky law that a deed should not be
220 Trio Realty Company v. Queenan, 360 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1962).
22176 C.J.S. Records § 2 (1952); 45 Am. Jur. Records and Recording Law
44 29, 84 (1943).
222 363 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1962).
223 12 C.J.S. Cancellation of Instruments § 23 (1938).
224 Id. at § 30.
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cancelled if the parties cannot be restored to their former position.2 5
Kentucky has held in such cases that where the grantee fails to
support the grantor as promised, cancellation may be decreed upon
terms which make allowance for the value of the services rendered. 226
The court in the Sanders case, however, expressed doubt whether a
substantial breach had been shown, and concluded that the defendant's
offer to perform solved the problem.227 Each case apparently turns on
its own peculiar circumstances.
E. M=ARY BESERVATioNS
In Kingwood Oil Company v. Henderson County Board of Super-
visors,228 the appellant corporation, as lessee of oil and gas rights
within the Camp Breckinridge military reservation, was assessed state
and county ad valorem. taxes. The court of appeals reversed the
assessment, holding that the lease rights were not subject to Kentucky
ad valorem taxes because: (1) the jurisdiction of the territory in
which the rights had their situs had never been retroceded to the
Commonwealth, and (2) Congress had never consented to the im-
position of such taxes on property within the boundaries of federal
enclaves.2 29
This decision was the court's first construction of KRS 3.010 since
it was amended in 1954.230 The statute originally gave blanket con-
sent to the acquisition of lands in Kentucky by the United States, but
the amendment, passed after Camp Breckinridge had been acquired
by the federal government, provides that "said acquisition shall not
be deemed to result in a cession of jurisdiction by this Common-
wealth."231 Prior to the amendment, the court had said that the
Commonwealth's consent to the acquisition of its land may be
accompanied by certain qualifications. 232 But no such qualifications
originally accompanied the statute, and the court in the Kingwood Oil
case ruled that the later amendment cannot operate to qualify the
22 5 Anderson v. McDaniel, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 151, 22 S.W. 647 (1893); see
generally 9 Am. Jr. Cancellation of Instruments § 39 (1937).
226Luster v. Whitlock, 203 Ky. 405, 262 S.W. 572 (1924); Humbles v.
Harris, 151 Ky. 685, 152 S.W. 797 (1913); see generally Annot., 112 A.L.R. 670,
708 (1938).
227 Sanders v. Needy 363 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Ky. 1963).
228 367 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1963).
229 Id. at 133.
230 Ky. Acts ch. 217, § 1 (1954).
231 KRS 3.010 (1963); see generally 54 Am. Jur. United States §§ 81-88
(1945).
232 Commonwealth v. King, 252 Ky. 699, 68 S.W.2d 45 (1934) held that the
state had no jurisdiction to try a bank cashier for false entries where the bank
was on a federal reservation and under a lease from the federal government.
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original unlimited consent with respect to lands acquired before the
amendment.233
The court has faced similar problems concerning the Fort Knox
military reservation and its ceding statute, KRS 8.030. In Hardin
County Board of Supervisors v. Kentucky Limousines,234 the court
held that the constitutional provision prohibiting a surrender of
taxing power by a grant of the Commonwealth 235 did not prevent the
cession of land to the United States for military purposes. The next
year, the 1954 amendment to KRS 8.010 was ruled not to limit the
Fort Knox grant made by KRS 8.030.236 The Kingwood Oil decision
goes one step further, holding the amendment ineffective as to the
blanket cession granted originally in KRS 3.010 under which Camp
Breckinridge was acquired.
F. DExic&ToN
Two cases concerning dedication arose in Kentucky during the
last term. The first case arose when the defendant city, in Pulaski
County v. City of Somerset,23 7 sought to remove by ordinance a park
located within the city. The situs of the park had been deeded in
1909 to the trustees of the city for the county's use. The park was
then constructed by a local club, the city, and the county. Since the
area had been designated, maintained, and used as a public park, the
court of appeals ruled that the area had been impliedly dedicated
for public park purposes. This ruling brings the case within KRS
97.580, which prohibits the repeal of ordinances creating parks on land
given to the city for that specific purpose. The holding that an area
may be inpliedly dedicated to a particular purpose after long use by
the public, generally fifteen years, even without formal dedication,
is supported by many Kentucky cases.233 The court's construction of
23SBut see, ops. Att'y Gen. # 60-561 (Ky. 1960), ruling that the state has
some jurisdiction over Camp Breckinridge "for certain purposes." The opinion
stated that "this question of the jurisdiction of the Federal Government and the
various states over the lands ceded by the various states to the Federal Government
is in a state of utter confusion." Ibid.
234293 S.W.2d 239 (Ky. 1956).
235 Ky. Const. § 175.23OLathey v. Lathey, 305 S.W.2d 920 (Ky. 1957). Falls City Brewing Co.
v. Reeves, 40 F. Supp. 85 (D.C.W.D.Ky. 1941) held that the Commonwealth, in
consenting to the acquisition by the United States of Fort Knox, did not include
a reservation in the Commonwealth of any right to levy taxes against property
owned or privileges enjoyed within Fort Knox.
237 364 S.W.2d 334 ( Ky. 1963).
238See, e.g., City of Hazard v. Eversole, 313 Ky. 254, 230 S.W.2d 921
(1950); Board of Park Comrs of Ashland v. Shanklin, 304 Ky. 43, 199 S.W.2d
721 (1947).
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the special purpose provision of the statute is also harmonious with
prior cases.
239
A recorded plat showing a layout for streets has always been
considered a dedication of that land for public use,240 even though
public authority has not obligated itself to maintain the street.241
The application of this old rule arose in the second dedication case,
Hougland v. Perdue,242 where abutting property owners brought an
action to allow them to build a street to provide a means of access to
their properties. Although the subdivision's recorded plat showed an
eighty foot roadway, the defendant had fenced half of the roadway
lying next to her house. She claimed she was a trustee for the county
with the right of occupation until the county assumed the responsi-
bility of maintenance of the road. The court of appeals held that the
recording of the plats and sale of the lots with reference thereto con-
stituted a dedication of streets in the subdivision to public use. The
property owners, therefore, were well within their rights in attempting
to improve the street.
G. OiL AN GAS LEASES
Kentucky case law has held that: (1) a mining lease which
authorizes the lessee to terminate at will by written notice is also
terminable at the will of the lessor,243 (2) a verbal lease containing
no period of termination may be terminated on notice,244 and (3) a
memorandum of agreement to lease mineral lands is considered a
lease at will and therefore terminable under KRS 883.140 upon one
month's notice.2 45 In Berry v. Walton,2 46 the court of appeals held that
where a mineral lease does not specify a term, nor place upon the
lessee any express obligation as to the term, the lease is terminable
at the will of the lessor. The court said:
But if the agreement is wholly executory and one of the parties is not
obligated even to commence the performance of it, there is lack of
mutuality. It is not the right of termination . .. but the right of non-
performance, that makes the agreement unenforceable. 247
239 See, e.g., Bedford-Nugent Co. v. Argue, 281 Ky. 827, 137 S.W.2d 392
(1939).
240 Jones v. Ramsey, 300 Ky. 692, 190 S.W.2d 37 (1945); Campbell v. Adams,
228 Ky. 156, 14 S.W.2d 418 (1929); Scheider v. Jacob, 86 Ky. 101, 5 S.W. 350
(1887); Ballard v. St. Cloud & Co., 10 Ky. Opin. 343 (1878).2 41 Stepp v. Webb, 836 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1960).
242 361 S.W.2d 291 (Ky. 1963).243 Killebrew v. Murray, 151 Ky. 345, 151 S.W. 662 (1912).
244 Addison v. Brandenburg, 202 Ky. 580, 260 S.W. 381 (1924).
245 Warren v. Cary-Glendon Coal Co., 313 Ky. 178, 230 S.W.2d 638 (1950).
246 366 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1963).
247 Id. at 174.
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In Wright v. Bethlehem Minerals Company,248 a mineral deed
gave the grantee the right to remove coal "in any manner and by any
method deemed either convenient or advisable" by the grantee, pro-
vided that no portion of the leased lands be used for the dumping
of slate.249 The grantee, under the broad provisions of the deed,
recovered the coal by rotary augering. Soil, rocks, and bushes were
displaced by the excavation for the placement of the machinery. The
grantor objected to this displacement as violating the provision of the
deed relating to the dumping of slate. The court of appeals held
that soil, rocks, and bushes are not slate within the meaning of the
deed.
The requirement of an intention to abandon an oil and gas lease
was presented to the court in Cameron v. Lebow.,50 This require-
ment is firmly imbededed in Kentucky case law.251 In the Lebow case,
the appellants were lessees of mineral rights in three adjoining tracts
of land. Two tracts had been drilled, but no development was done
on the third tract for sixteen years. The court conceded that sixteen
years was a long time to allow the tract to go undeveloped, but held
that the lapse of time was merely evidence of abandonment.252 An
intention is still necessary.
[ . . ITIhe intention to abandon must be shown by "clear, unequivocal,
and decisive evidence" in order for an abandonment to be established.
... We have said that "abandonment of a mineral lease consists of
surrender of the property, coupled with an intention to relinquish the
lease and is, in fact, to be determined in each case upon the surrounding
circumstances."
253
Here, the lease in the chain of title was sufficient to put anyone on
notice of the lessee's claim, and the lessees had, in fact, stated to the
appellees that they owned the lease. Although three judges dissented,
they did not disagree with the rule, so the rule remains that a mere
lapse of time and non-use by the lessee, unaccompanied by other
evidence showing an intention to abandon, does not constitute
abandonment.
248 868 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1963).
249 Id. at 180.
250 366 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1963).
2 51Fuquor v. Chester Oil Co., 246 S.W.2d 1007 (Ky. 1952); American
Wholesale Corp. v. F. & S. Oil & Gas Co., 242 Ky. 356, 46 S.W.2d 498 (1932);
Trammel Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Sarver, 197 Ky. 594, 247 S.W. 753 (1923);
Cadillac Oil & Gas Co. v. Harrison, 196 Ky. 290, 244 S.W. 669 (1922).
252 See Hodges v. Mud Branch Oil & Gas Co., 270 Ky. 206, 109 S.W.2d 576
(1937).
253 H. B. Cameron v. Lebow, 366 S.W.2d 164, 165-166 (Ky. 1963);
Browning v. Cavanaugh, 800 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1957).
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H. Wnmis
In White v. White, 54 the decedent disposed of her property by
a holographic will, leaving a legacy to her nephew for "only his
lifetime, after his death what is left to come back to the immediate
White heirs that are living."255 The court held that the nephew took
a life estate with right to encroach upon the corpus of the estate for
customary living expenses, and that after his death the property
remaining would pass to the decedents brothers and sisters. The
words "what is left" were construed to have the same meaning as
"remaining undisposed of." These latter words are sufficient to
create in the life tenant the power to encroach upon the principal so
long as he does not waste it, give it away, or dispose of it by will.256
In Hendron v. Brown, 57 a holographic will was attacked because
it was alledgedly not wholly in the decedents handwriting. The
appellants offered to call some of the contestants to testify that the
signature on the will was not the decedents. The trial court refused
to allow the contestants' testimony, considering it a violation of KRS
421.210(2), which prohibits anyone from testifying for himself con-
cerning any act done by a dead person. The court of appeals reversed,
and held that testimony of the contestants, based on observation of
the will, was admissible because: "(1) the testimony does not
recount or describe a specific transaction or act of the deceased, and
(2) it constitutes an opinion of the witness based on physical evidence
which does not purport to portray a particular event."258
This case appears to be the first case holding such testimony
admissible under the statute. In Hale v. Hale,259 the court had held
that the statute prohibited interested parties from testifying as to an
act of the deceased, except where the testimony attacked either the
mental capacity of, or undue influence on, the testator, thus reputiating
the assumption that the statute did not apply to will cases. The
statute is now construed by the Hendron case to allow testimony of
will contestants respecting the authenticity of the decedents hand-
writing.
The question of whether an attestation clause could be used to
invalidate a will arose in Wroblewski v. Yeager.2 60 The probate of the
254 365 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1968).
2S5 Ibid.
256 Collins v. Collins Ex'rs, 260 S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1963).
257 364 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1962).
25 8Hendron v. Brown, 364 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Ky. 1962).
259 242 Ky. 810, 47 S.W.2d 706 (1932).
260 361 S.W.2d 108 (Ky. 1962).
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will was contested because the attestation clause recited that the
witnesses had initiated the first five pages of the will, when in fact
the probated instrument had no initials on its pages. The contestants
questioned the authenticity of those specific pages. The two witnesses
still living testified that they had not initialed the first five pages. The
court of appeals held that the will was properly admitted to probate.
The court reasoned that the statement in the attestation clause did
not relate to a required formality of execution and the surplusage
should be ignored as hearsay, especially since the two witnesses had
volunteered information contradicting the superfluous statement. The
court further reasoned that the burden of proof in a will contest is on
the contestant, and the mere attempt to impeach the attesting wit-
nesses by reference to nonessential provisions of the attestation clause
did not satisfy the burden. Previously, in Poindexter's Administrator
v. Alexander,261 the court had held that when "the evidence of an
attesting witness contradicts a positive statement ... his own testimony
cannot as a matter of law overcome the prima facie case made out
by the will itself."2 62 In the Yeager case, the court distinguished the
Alexander case on the ground that in the latter case the testimony of
the attesting witness concerned an essential formality compliance
with which the propounder had the burden of proving. Thus, a jury
issue was present in the Alexander case, while in the Yeager case the
contestants failed to meet their burden as a matter of law.
Another will case arose in Call v. Call,2 3 where the plaintiff, as
devisee under his paternal grandfather's will, took a life estate with
the remainder to his legal heirs. The plaintiff petitioned under KRS
389.040 for the sale of the property, naming his father, his sister, his
infant children, and his unborn heirs as defendants. The contestants
appealed, contending that the children in being of the sister and her
unborn heirs were necessary parties to the action and were not before
the court. The court of appeals held that all necessary parties were
before the court. The sister's children were not necessary parties
because if the plaintiff had died prior to the action, the title would
have vested in his children. If there were no children then living, the
title would have reverted to the testators estate to descend according
to the laws of descent and distribution, in which case the title would
have vested in the testator's son, the plaintiff's father. In the event
of his death, the property would have vested in the sister, and as she
was before the court, all the correct and necessary parties were
261277 Ky. 147, 125 S.W.2d 981 (1939).
262 Id. at 154, 125 S.W.2d at 985.
203 367 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1963).
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before the court. This decision is consistent with earlier case law
construing the statute.
264
I. TRusTs
Kentucky courts have generally held that limitations of trusts are
not incompatible with the devise of an absolute estate.265 Realty
thus devised to someone in trust is not inconsistent with its being
devised to him in fee. Such a situation arose in Barth v. Citizens
Fidelity Bank & Trust Company.266 Testatrix devised property to her
nephew in fee, but subject to a trust for him during life. The nephew
disposed of the property by will, whereupon residuary legatees under
the testatrix' will contested the nephew's right to divise in fee simple.
The court held that the nephew took the fee simple title to the
estate held in trust and could devise the fee simple title held therein.
This holding is consistent with White v. White,267 where the court
held that if the devisee was given unlimited powers of disposition,
including the power to pass title by will, he held title in fee. In the
Barth case, the testatrix specifically devised in fee simple, so it must
be assumed that she intended the devisee to have the right to dispose
of the property will.
The second trust case arising during the last term concerned an
attempt to create a trust. In Whitehead v. Donnely,268 a holographic
will devised the residue of decedents property to two legatees "to
distribute as I have directed."269 The trial court held this provision
referred to distribution of items specifically mentioned in other parts
of the will, so the legatees took the residue in fee simple. The court
of appeals reversed, stating that, as the testatrix apparently assumed
she had disposed of the items mentioned in the will, she could not
have considered them to be a part of the residue left for distribution
2
G
4 Weddle v. Weddle, 280 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1955), held that in an action
for the sale of remainder and contingent interests under the statute, where all
contingent remaindermen joined all life tenants and contingent life tenants as
plaintiffs, and infant contingent remaidermen were joined as defendants with the
unborn heirs of the life tenants and contingent life tenants and were represented
by guardian ad litem, then all procedural steps were complied with, and the sale
was proper. Security Trust Co. v. Mahoney, 307 Ky. 661, 212 S.W.2d 115
(1948), held that in an action by the life tenant for the sale of real estate for
reinvestment under the statute, only those contingent remaindermen in whom
title would vest if the contingency had happened before the action was com-
menced need be joined.
265 Clay v. McNabb, 286 Ky. 751, 151 S.W.2d 1027 (1941); Radford v.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 185 Ky. 453, 215 S.W. 285 (1919); Websters
Trustee v. Webster, 93 Ky. 632, 21 S.W. 332 (1893).
266 368 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1963).
267 365 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1963).
268 368 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1963).
269 Ibid.
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to the legatees. The contested provision, rather, was an attempt to
create a trust which was unsuccessful for indefiniteness, resulting in
a simple failure to make a testamentary disposition.
This appears to be a proper construction of the provision. The
court said, "the residue was left to the legatees for the purpose of
carrying out some plan the testatrix had in mind. The language
diametrically opposes the vesting of a fee simple title in them."270
As in the usual case of failure of testamentary disposition, the residue
passes to the heirs at law.
271
The third trust case, Potter v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance
Company,272 involved the "subsisting trust" doctrine. The decedent
was a trustee and a life tenant under a trust with a remainder to her
two children. The decedent, pursuant to her right to encroach upon
the principal, purchased from the defendant endowment policies
which were payable to her at maturity, or if she should die before
maturity, to her two children. Later she amended the policies, the
effect of which was to change the interests of the children from legal
remainders to equitable remainders for life, with ultimate distribution
to the children's issue. After her death, the children demanded
payment from the defendant of the face amount of the policies. The
defendant declined to do so without a court judgment. The children
contented themselves with accepting the income payments until
seventeen years after the death of the decedent. IKRS 418.120(5)
provides that the limitation on such a suit is five years. The children
contended that the actions of the decendent in varying the terms of
the trust was not a repudiation of the trust, but merely an extension
of the trust by variation which was voidable. Therefore, they
claimed, unless they elected to avoid it, the trust subsisted and,
hence, the statute of limitation was controlled by KRS 413.840,
which provides that the statute of limitation does not apply to a
subsisting trust.
The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant. The court
defined a subsisting trust as one in which the trustee is acting within
his powers and the beneficiary has no cause of action against him.
The court found that the trust which was subsisting and which
operated to obstruct the right of the children to immediate enjoyment
was not the same trust as the original trust which had come to an
end at the decedent's death. Admittedly, the court reasoned, if the
270 Id. at 838.
271 Spradlin v. Wiman, 272 Ky. 724 114 S.W.2d 1111 (1938); Arnold v.
Clay, 262 Ky. 336, 90 S.W.2d 55 (1936); House of Mercy of N.Y. v. Cromie,
6 Ky. Opin. 363 (1882).
t2 361 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. 1962).
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defendant had withheld the corpus under a claim of right in itself,
the statute would have begun to run at the decedent's death. A
claim in behalf of the children's issue who did not derive title from
the original trust was similarly inconsistent with the children's title.
Therefore, the court held that the statute began to run at the death
of the decedent and that the claim was barred.
VII. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Three recent divorce cases were handed down by the court of
appeals. In the first, Dalton v. Dalton,2 73 a mother violated the terms
of the judgment relating to the custody of the children and the
father's visitation rights. The court affirmed the rule that the violation
did not exonerate the father of contempt for his failure to comply
with a judgment requiring monthly payments for the children's
support. The court referred to its prior decisions in Campbell v.
Campbell,-2 4 Spencer v. Spencer,275 and Beutel v. Beutel276 all of
which held in effect that the mother's violation of the custodial
judgment could not constitute a defense to contempt charges against
the father for his failure to pay child support..2 77 The court pointed
out that:
Whatever infractions there may have been on the mother's part, the
children should not be deprived of their natural and legal right of
support from their father on account of the dissensions of their parents
for causes of which they are innocent... and the father may not evade
his obligation to support his children on the ground of such dis-
sensions.2
78
This decision is illustrative of the court's attempts to insure the
security of children who have suffered the misfortune of a broken
home.2 7
9
In the second domestic relations case, Henderson v. Baker,8 0 a
divorce decree, pursuant to statute,28 . provided that the parties restore
to each other all the property obtained from the other by reason of
the marriage. The husband and wife owned a house as joint tenants
with right of survivorship. Upon the death of the husband, the wife
contended that since the husband had not asserted his right to
restoration of his portion of the house, she was entitled to the fee
2733 67 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1963).
274213 Ky. 621, 281 S.W. 800 (1926).
27 312 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1958).
270300 Ky. 756, 189 S.W.2d 933 (1945).
277Accord, In re Stuart, 72 App. D.C. 389, 114 F.2d 825 (1940); Aberlin
v. Domestic Relations Court of the City of N.Y., 159 F. Supp. 59 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.
1958); Fiore v. Fiore, 49 N.J. Super. 219, 139 A.2d 414 (1958).278 Dalton v. Dalton, 367 S.W.2d 840, 843 (Ky. 1963).
27) That the supreme and paramount consideration in domestic relations cases
is the child's welfare has long been followed in Kentucky. See, e.g., Donoho v.
Donoho, 357 S.W.2d 665 (Ky. 1962); Sevier v. Sevier, 280 S.W.2d 526 (Ky.
1955); Youngblood v. Youngblood, 252 S.W.2d 21 (Ky. 1952); Maynard v.
Maynard, 302 Ky. 590, 195 S.W.2d 304 (1946); Clark v. Clark, 298 Ky. 18, 181
S.W.2d 397 (1944); Skidmore v. Skidmore, 261 Ky. 327, 87 S.W.2d 631 (1935);
Day v. Day, 213 Ky. 562, 281 S.W. 493 (1926); Colson v. Colson, 153 Ky. 68,
154 S.W. 380 (1913); Davis v. Davis, 140 Ky. 526, 131 S.W. 266 (1910); Irwin
v. Irwin, 105 Ky. 632, 49 S.W. 432 (1899).
280362 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1962).
281 KRS 403.065 (1963).
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simple of the property. The court of appeals held that she was
entitled to only that portion which she had contributed by reason of
the marriage. The court reasoned that the right of restoration
conferred by the statute is not strictly a personal right, that the
personal representative for an estate is under a duty to assert the
right for the estate, and that the parties to a divorce action may
themselves obtain restoration in an independent subsequent pro-
ceeding.282 The court relied upon Ficke v. Prudential Insurance Com-
pany of America,283 which held that after the death of a divorced
husband, his personal representative could compel restoration to the
estate of the proceeds of a life insurance policy where the husband
paid the premiums subsequent to the divorce, but failed to change
his divorced wife as named beneficiary. This rule was extended by
the court to apply where real property was jointly owned, so the
divorced wife would be entitled to only the amount that she actually
contributed toward the investment,28 4 and any domestic services
which she rendered to help accumulate funds from the husband's
earnings would give her no right in the property.28 5
In the third case, Robinson v. Robinson,28 a decree allowing
the divorced wife twenty dollars per week for the support of two
minor children was held insufficient even though the father earned
only sixty dollars per week. The court of appeals emphasized that
the trial court should first determine the minimum amount needed
for the decent support of the children, then decree that this amount
should be paid regardless of the earnings of the father. If the father
is unable to comply, mitigating circumstances addressed to the court
in defense of any contempt proceedings affords him adequate relief
against possible oppression.287 The court concluded that it was not
prepared to fix the amount necessary for the support of the two
children, but that twenty dollars per week was insufficient.288
282 Mills v. Epperson, 259 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1953).
283 805 Ky. 172, 202 S.W.2d 429 (1947).
284 Kivett v. Kivett, 312 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1958).
285 Pearson v. Pearson, 350 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1961).
286 363 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1962).
2871d. at 113.
288 Id. at 114,
VIII. CORPORATIONS
The two cases decided during the last term involved the right
of a corporate fiduciary to vote its own corporation's stock and the
right of a creditor to have a receiver pendente lite appointed.
In Graves v. Security Trust Company,2 9 the court held that a
corporation, holding some of its own stock in a fiduciary capacity,
could vote the stock in favor of consolidation despite the provisions
of KRS 271.135. That statute provides, in effect, that a corporation
may not directly or indirectly vote shares of its own capital stock
belonging to the corporation. The court reasoned that the statute
did not apply because the corporation did not "own" the stock within
the meaning of the statute. The stock owned by the trust estate, not
the corporation.
The decision is the first to interpret KRS 271.135. Some statutes
in other jurisdictions specifically provide that a corporation may vote
shares of its own stock held by it in a fiduciary capacity.290 However,
the general rule is that a corporation which owns some of its own
stock may not vote that stock,291 and at least one statute has adopted
this approach.292 Therefore, the decision of the court is novel since
it limits the scope of the Kentucky statute.
In Dulworth and Burress Tobacco Warehouse Company v. Bur-
ress,293 the court reaffirmed a longstanding position that a receiver
pendente lite could not be appointed in the absence of a showing
by the shareholder or creditor, pursuant to KRS 27.061, that the
corporation's property is in imminent danger of being lost, removed,
or materially injured. The plaintiff was a shareholder and creditor
and brought this action alleging irregularities in business conduct.
An order of appointment was granted even though the defendants,
who were shareholders, directors, and officers of the corporation,
offered to post a bond sufficient to satisfy any judgment the plaintiff
might recover against the corporation.
In reversing the appointment the court pointed out that the
remedy of a receiver pendente lite, being a remedy of last resort,
cannot be granted where a less drastic remedy such as the posting of
a bond is available. The decision is in accord with the rule in other
jurisdictions29 4 and is supported by the rationalization that so long
289 369 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1963).
290 Lattin, Corporations 300 (1959).
291 Stevens, Corporations 528 (2d ed. 1949).
292 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 31 (1953).
293 369 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1963).
294 75 C.J.S. Receivers § 10 (1955).
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as the shareholder's pecuniary interests are adequately protected, the
property of the corporation should not be taken out of managements
hands and placed in those of a receiver.
IX. COMMERCIAL LAW
While it might be expected that litigation involving the Uniform
Commercial Code would be forthcoming, there remains a dearth of
decisions on the Code in Kentucky. The court only had occasion to
decide one case involving it during the year. In Spurlin v. Sloan, 95
the court held that:
*.. no part of KRS 355, commonly referred to as the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, applies to a written assignment of funds presently due and
owing for the purpose of liquidation or satisfying a prior existing obliga-
tion.
2 9 6
In this case a debtor made a written assignment of funds due him
for services rendered under a highway contract. Subsequently the
plaintiff, a creditor of the assignor, secured an attachment lien against
the same funds. The plaintiff avoided the common law rule in Ken-
tucky that the assignee of a prior assignment has priority over a
subsequent attaching creditor297 by arguing that the assignment
was a "security interest" under the Code. Therefore, since the interest
was unperfected and the applicable provision 298 protects a lien creditor
without knowledge of the prior assignment in this situation, the
plaintiff argued that he should prevail.
In rejecting this argument, the court concluded that the assignment
was not a security transaction and therefore no provision of the Code
was applicable. The assignment was an absolute one of a fund that
was due and owing at the time for the purpose of settling partnership
accounts between the assignor and assignee, and did not involve the
retention of a security interest by either party.
In Payne v. Terry, 299 the court was concerned with whether the
particular instrument involved was a promissory note. The writing
signed by the defendants stated: "Borrowed $7000 to buy farm
to be paid when house is sold." The court held that the instrument
was an enforceable promissory note. The rule in Kentucky is that
before a promissory note may exist there must be a written promise
to pay a fixed sum of money at a specified time or at a time that must
295 368 S.W.2d 314 (Ky. 1963).
290 Id. at 316.297R. C. Poage Milling Co. v. Economy Fuel Co., 128 S.W. 311 (Ky. 1910).
2 8 KRS 855.9-301(1) (b) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected
security interest is subordinate to the rights of...
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of
the security interest and before it is perfected...
299 367 S.W.2d 277 (Ky. 1963).
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certainly arrive. 00 Therefore, the only question before the court was
whether the words of the instrument contained a promise. Relying
upon its prior decision in Harrow v. Dugan,8 01 the court decided the
word "borrowed" imported a promise to pay and consequently that
the instrument was an enforceable promissory note. While the
pertinent Code provision was not applicable because the note was
made prior to its adoption, the conclusion to be drawn is that the
result would have been the same. This is so because the Code
defines a "promise" as an undertaking to pay which is more than an
acknowledgment of the obligation.30 2 Clearly, in view of the court's
previous decision in the Harrow case, the word "borrowed" does more
than acknowledge an obligation. At the least it imports an under-
taking to pay.
In perhaps the last case to be decided in Kentucky under the
Uniform Sales Act, 03 the court passed upon whether it was error
to grant a judgment n.o.v. where a jury decided that a conditional
sales contract had been rescinded within a reasonable time, but
awarded less than the minimum damages to which the plaintiffif was
entitled upon rescission. In Chaplin v. Bissire Company,3 0 4 the plain-
tiff purchased a walk-in refrigerator from defendant under a condi-
tional sales contract. The refrigerator was defective upon installation,
but the defendant guaranteed it to perform and corrected certain
defects which continued to appear for a period of two years. Finally,
after the plaintiff incurred a substantial loss due to a rise in tempera-
ture from the failure of an electrical fuse, it notified the defendant
that it was rescinding the contract and tendering a return of the box.
The defendant refused to accept this tender. The plaintiff brought an
action to rescind and the jury found that the plaintiff had notified
the defendant of its decision to rescind within a reasonable time after
it accepted the merchandise in accordance with the requirement of
the Uniform Sales Act.305 The court held that it was error to award
a judgment n.o.v. on the ground that as a matter of law timely notice
of rescission was not given, because reasonable men could differ.
Therefore, the question was properly one of fact for the jury.
300 Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Lyons, 802 Ky. 889, 196 S.W.2d 605
(Ky. 1946).
30136 Ky. 341 (1838).
302 KRS 855.3-101 (1) (c).
3 0 3 KRS 361.690(3).
304 361 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1962).
30 5 KRS 361 690(3) provides: "Where the goods have been delivered to the
buyer, he cannot rescind the sale . . . if he fails to notify the seller within a
reasonable time of the election to rescind."
[Vol. 52,
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The real significance of the case, however, concerns what is a
reasonable time within which the buyer can rescind. The court
suggested that the "reasonable time" for notifying the seller of rescis-
sion does not begin to run against the buyer if the latter, as in the
Chaplin case, promptly calls upon the seller to make good his warranty
and the seller continues to make efforts to remedy defects as they
arise. While this statement by the court is dictum, it is at least strong
dictum and may well be an indication of a rule of construction to be
followed in Kentucky in interpreting the provision of the Uniform
Commercial Code dealing with the same problem.300
306 KRS 355.2-608(2) provides: "Revocation of acceptance must occur
within a reasonable time. ...
X. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Of the several cases decided last term involving unemployment
compensation, two are particularly worthy of note. In Kentucky
Unemployment Insurance Commission v. American National Bank &
Trust Company,307 the issue was the effect of the "good cause" statutes,
KRS 341.870 and KRS 341.530,308 on the termination of temporary
employment. The employer began renovation of its permanent prem-
ises and moved to a temporary location in order to carry on business.
Since it was necessary to employ a guard at the temporary location,
the employee was hired. He worked for one year, after which time
the employer returned to its renovated location where the employee's
services were no longer required. The employee, upon the termination
of his employment, filed an application for unemployment benefits.
The application was allowed and the payments were charged to the
employer's reserve account. On appeal to the circuit court, it was
held that the employee voluntarily quit his employment within the
meaning of the "good cause" statutes so that the payments were not
chargeable to the employer's reserve account, but to the pooled
account. The court of appeals reversed. An employee who accepted
a job which he knew to be temporary did not voluntarily leave his
employment and was not, therefore, disqualified under the "good
cause" statutes from receiving unemployment benefits.
The circuit court felt bound by Kentucky Unemployment Insurance
Commission v. Kroehler Manufacturing Company.309 In that case, an
employee voluntarily quit his employment because he had accepted
a retirement plan which required him to retire at age sixty-five. It
was held that such retirement was voluntary under the "good cause
statutes. The court in the principal case distinguished Kroehler. In
Kroehler, there was work to do, but the employee quit; in the principal
case, the employee quit, but there was no work to do. Such a decision
would seem to be within the spirit of the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Acts since the purpose of these acts is to protect those persons
who lose employment because of forces beyond their control.310
The second case particularly worthy of interest is Johnson v. Ken-
307 367 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1963).
3
0 8 KRS 341.370 provides that a worker shall be disqualified from receiving
benefits if he had left his most recent suitable work witout good cause. KRS
341.530 provides in substance that benefits paid shall be charged against the
"pool" if the worker voluntarily left his most recent work without good cause
attributable to the employment.
309 352 S.W.2d 212 (1961).
310 Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 367 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1963).
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tucky Unemployment Insurance Commission.311 This case involved
the effect of an injunction under the Taft-Hartley Act 12 against strik-
ing steelworkers on their eligibility to draw unemployment benefits.
The appellants were members of the United Steelworkers of America
and went on strike July 15, 1959, when a nationwide strike was
called. On November 7, 1959, the striking workers were ordered back
to work pursuant to an injunction granted by the district court.313
Between November 15 and November 22, 1959, the appellants were
called back to work at various times. Several months later, while
the injunction was still in effect, a new collective bargaining agreement
was reached. The appellants applied for unemployment benefits for
the period November 8 to November 22 pursuant to KRS 841.350.
The claims were denied by the Commission and the denial affirmed
by the circuit court. On appeal to the court of appeals, the judgment
was affirmed.
KRS 841.860(1) provides that a worker may not be paid benefits
if " . . a strike or other bona fide labor dispute which caused him to
leave his employment is in active progress in an establishment in which
he is or was employed. . . ." The question presented was whether
a strike or dispute was in active progress within the meaning of the
statute. If the effect of the injunction was to cause the active progress
of the strike or dispute to cease on November 7, then, even though that
period of unemployment between November 8 and November 22 may
have been the result of the strike, the workers would be entitled to
benefits.
3 14
The court relied on Ward v. Barnes,3 15 in reaching its decision. In
that case the parties to a labor dispute had arrived at a voluntary
truce with the understanding that the employer would adopt a new
system of operation. As a result of the new system, a bottleneck
arose, and a lay off of some workers became necessary. The union
withdrew its objection to the former system and the controversy was
terminated. Unemployment compensation claims of the laid-off work-
ers were denied on the basis that work had been resumed under a
mere truce and the dispute had not ceased to be in active progress
until the agreement to reinstitute the old system. Ward v. Barnes, the
311 Johnson v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 367 S.W.2d 253 (Ky.
1963).
312 Labor Management Relations Act § 120, 61 Stat. 155 (1947); § 32(a),
62 Stat. 991 (1948); § 127, 63 Stat. 107 (1949), 29 Usc § 179 (1958).
313 United States v. United Steelworkers of America, 178 F. Supp. 297
(W.D.Pa. 1959), aff'd 271 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1959), aff'd 361 U.S. 39 (1959).
314 Johnson v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, supra note 5, at 255.
315 266 S.W.2d 388 (Ky. 1954).
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court felt, was determinative of this issue. A voluntary truce did
not terminate the dispute; a fortiori, an involuntary truce would not
terminate it. In the Johnson case, the court said that "all the kept the
dispute from taking the form of a strike was the existence of a
temporary injunction"216 and the dispute was still in active progress
within the meaning of KRS 341.370(1).
316 Johnson v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, supra note 5, at 257.
XI. WOBKMEN'S COMPENSATION
During the past term the court of appeals handed down several
noteworthy workmen's compensation cases. The most interesting of
these was Leep v. Kentucky State Police,317 a case construing the
meaning of the phrase "total disability from work" as used in KRS
342.095. In that case, a state trooper had suffered a compound fracture
of his leg in 1950. After the injury, the trooper was assigned to office
duty, finally resigning his employment in 1951. When evidence was
taken in 1957, amputation of his leg was indicated as an eventual
probability. In the interim, the trooper held a different type of job
doing sedentary work, for which his earnings were approximately
4,000 dollars per year. Uncontradicted medical testimony indicated
that the trooper was limited to sedentary work. The Kentucky Work-
men's Compensation Board found against total disability. The court
of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence compelled, as a matter
of law, a finding of total permanent disability.
When the injury occurred, KRS 342.110(2) provided that in no
event shall compensation for an injury to a member exceed the
amount allowable for the loss of such member. A previous case,
Hardy Burlingham Mining Company v. Sawyer,318 had held that the
limitation did not apply to cases of permanent total disability. In
E. & L. Transport Company v. Hayes,319 "total disability" was con-
strued to mean that if a workman is totally disabled from the per-
formance of work in his former occupational classification, and his
capacity to perform other kinds of work is impaired, he is entitled to
compensation of total disability. Such a construction would not seem
warranted from the language of the statute. The opinion in the
principal case indicated that the writer of the Hayes opinion wished
to reconsider this construction, but the majority here refused to do
so.3 20 Therefore, the principal case must be considered as a reaffirma-
tion of Hayes.
Having reaffirmed the construction of "total disability," the court
found that since the trooper was limited to sedentary work, his ability
to secure employment as a trooper was virtually ended. Since police
work was his line of work, the court held that he was totally disabled
under KRS 342.095.
317 366 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1962). In 1960 KRS 342.110 and KBS 342.095
were amended to reflect this holding.
318 254 S.W.2d 350 (Ky. 1953).
319 341 S.W.2d 240 (Ky. 1960).
3 2 0 Lepp v. Kentucky State Police, 366 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Ky. 1962).
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Another noteworthy case, Stacy v. Noble,321 clarified the judicially
created exceptions to KRS 342.055. In that case, the employee was
injured by a third party in the course of his employment. The em-
ployer's compensation carrier awarded the employee approximately
15,000 dollars plus 2,500 dollars for medical expenses. The employee
hired an attorney to prosecute a claim against the third party and
agreed to pay the attorney one-third of the amount received. In the
tort action, the employee claimed 4,474 dollars for medical expenses.
The jury awarded the employee a general verdict of 30,000 dollars
and the third party's insurer paid 5,000 dollars, the limits of the policy,
into court. The employer's compensation carrier claimed the entire
5,000 dollars under KRS 342.055, which subrogated the compensation
carrier to the rights of the employee in a third party action to the
extent of the award made by the compensation carrier. The employee
claimed the difference between the amount he claimed for medical
expenses against the third party and the amount awarded by the com-
pensation carrier, plus one-third of the partial satisfaction of the
judgment as a contractual attorney's fee.
On appeal, the court discussed the judicially made exception to
the subrogation rule of KRS 342.055. Under this exception, the
attorney's fees and, under certain circumstances, medical expenses are
segregated from the amount to which the compensation carrier is
entitled. 322 In order to remove medical expenses from the subrogation
rights of the compensation carrier, the jury in the tort action must
return a special item of damages for medical expenses.3 23 In the
principal case, the jury did not return a verdict including special
damages for medical expenses. Therefore, the court refused to
speculate as to what portion of the general verdict was for medical
expenses and disallowed any segregation from the general verdict
In the principal case, the court laid down a clear rule as to when
an employee is entitled to segregate his attorney's fees from the
compensation carrier's subrogation rights in a tort recovery. Until
1962, the rule was that the right to segregate attorney's fees would be
denied unless there were some sort of contractual relations between
the attorney and the compensation carrier.82 4 Charles Seligman Dis-
tributing Company v. Brown,3 2 i decided in 1962, changed this rule
by holding that if the compensation carrier has a reasonable oppor-
321 361 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. 1962).
322 Southern Quarries & Contracting Co. v. Hensley, 313 Ky. 640, 232
S.W.2d 999 (1950).
823 bid.
324 Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Snyder, 291 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1956); Spinner
v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 245 Ky. 519, 53 S.W.2d 946 (1932).
325 360 S.W.2d 509 (Ky. 1962).
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tunity to intervene in the tort action, the attorney's fees for the
prosecution of the action may be segregated from the verdict to which
the compensation carrier is subrogated. The opinion in the principal
case reads that if the "employee's counsel actually bears the burden
of obtaining recovery from the third party, then whoever takes the
money is chargeable with a share of the fee. The fee must, however,
be a reasonable one."S26 Thus, the principal case puts no condition on
the recovery of the fee except that the fee be reasonable. The reason
for the rule is clear-one should not without cost reap the benefits
of the attorney's labor.
Two cases of procedural interest were decided involving appeals
to the circuit court as provided by KRS 342.285. In Creech v. Rob-
erts,3 27 the referee bad prepared a report to the effect that the claimant
had failed to prove that the parties were acting under the Workme's
Compensation Act and recommended dismissal of the claim. The
claim. The claimant filed a motion with the Board to reopen, which
was overruled on the grounds that the case had been decided by the
referee's order. The claimant appealed to the circuit court, which
remanded the case to the Board with directions to hear additional
evidence. The court of appeals held that the circuit court had no
jurisdiction to hear the appeal since there was no order which it
could review. The order dismissing the claim was not an order of
the Board until approved by a majority of its members. There had
been no final determination of the case and hence no award that
could be reviewed under KRS 342.285. The judgment was reversed
ith directions to enter a judgment dismissing the appeal.
It has been held on numerous occasions that no appeal can be
heard if there is no final order of the Board.328 In Paul v. Allender
Brown Company,3 29 however, it was held that an odrer of the Board
overruling a motion to reopen appellant's claim was a final disposition
of the case and was, therefore, appealable to the circuit court. This
case was not expressly overruled in Creech but it would seem to have
that effect.
Epling v. Ratliff330 was a similar case with the exception that there
was no motion to reopen. The referee had made a report ruling
that the employee had not lost his life in an accident arising out of
the course of his employment.331 The case was not submitted to the
$28 Stacy v. Noble, 316 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Ky. 1962).
3273 62 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1962).
3 28 Kabai v. Majestic Collieries Co., 286 Ky. 279, 150 S.W.2d 898 (1941);
Spencer v. Chavies Coal Co., 280 Ky. 152, 132 S.W.2d 746 (1939).
329 249 S.W.2d 163 (Ky. 1952).
330 364 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1963).
331 KRS 342.005(1) was the applicable provision.
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Board or any member thereof. The applicant filed suit in the circuit
court praying that the order be reversed, on the theory that since the
applicant did not elect to ask for a full board review, as provided by
KRS 342.280 and 342.285(1), the award and opinion of the referee
became final. The court of appeals held that the circuit court should
have ruled that on the face of the record it had no jurisdiction and
dismissed the complaint. KRS 342.280(1) provides for a hearing by
the full board does not indicate that the report of the referee can
ever be regarded as a decision of the Board itself. The judgment of
the circuit court was declared void as to not prejudice the parties.
In the Epling case, the report was not a final order of the Board
and the claimant remained free to assert his appeal to the Board,
subject to the statutory provisions as to time for appeal. The claimant
in the Creech case, on the other hand, appealing from an order of the
Board overruling his motion to reopen, was left without a remedy of
administrative or judicial review.
An area in which problems have arisen in the past, that of notice
to the employer in cases involving occupational diseases, received the
consideration of the court in two cases of importance. KRS 342.316(2)
provides
... notice of claim shall be given to the employer as soon as practicable
after the employee first experiences a distinct manifestation of an
occupational disease in the form of symptoms reasonably sufficient to
apprise him that he has contracted such disease, or a diagnosis of such
disease is first communicated to him, whichever shall first occur.
This language was construed earlier in Mary Helen Coal Corporation
v. Chitwood332 to mean that the duty to notify does not arise until the
disease results in an actual impairment of the employee's working
capacity.
The first of the two major cases in this area to be decided this
past term was Inland Steel Co. v. MullinS.a33 The appellant sought
to have judgment for the claimant reversed on the basis that the
appellee had failed to give notice as soon as practicable after he
learned he was disabled by silicosis. 334 On August 18, 1960, the
appellee quit his employment and notified his foreman that he was
no longer able to work. Prior to that time, in 1958, he had consulted
a company physician complaining of shortness of breath. The ailment
was diagnosed as pneumoconiosis. A report of the diagnosis was sent
to the appellant at this time. Subsequently, the appellee received
332 351 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1961).
333 367 S.W.2d 250 (Ky. 1963).34 KR S 342,316(2) was the basis for this contention,
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periodic examinations by company physicians and discussed his con-
dition with a company official. In 1959, he was given an outside job,
where he remained until the date he quit in 1960. The court held
that these circumstances showed timeliness of notice. It further
stated that the notice pursuant to KRS 342.816(2) was not required
until:
(1) The employee has a disability from an occupational disease which
impairs his capacity to perform his work, and
(2) the employee knows or should know by the exercise of reasonable
care and diligence that he is suffering from the disease.3 35
The court cited the Chitwood case and Peabody Coal Company v.
Guthrie3 6 for support.
By way of dictum, the court added that assuming appellees health
was poor and he was susceptible to illness, as was contended by the
employer, "industry takes a man as it finds him."a3r The Workmen's
Compensation Act is not limited to employees only in good health.
This statement is a reaffimation of the present law.3ss
Bethlehem Mines Corporation v. Davis339 was the second important
decision which dealt with the problem of notice last term. The
claimant suffered from a respiratory ailment that caused him to quit
his employment after working in the mines of his employer and its
predecessor for over thirty years. He testified that he had been sick
for two or three years but had forced himself to continue working
until he had to quit. The employer, who did not know of his condition
until shortly after he quit, contended that notice was not timely
given as required by KRS 842.316(2). The court of appeals applied
the provision as construed in the case and determined that "so long
as a man is able to carry on his duties, though he may suffer while
doing it, he is not yet disabled within the meaning of KRS 42.816(2)"
and has no duty to notify until such disability occurs.
3 40
335 Inland Steel Co. v. Mullins, 867 S.W.2d 250, 252 (Ky. 1963).
336351 S.W.2d 168 (Ky. 1961).
337 Inland Steel Co. v. Mullins, supra note 19, at 253.3 38Parrott v. S. A. Healy Co., 290 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1956); Stasel v.
American Standard Radiator Sanitary Corp., 278 S.W.2d 721 (Ky. 1955);
Hendricks v. Kentucky and Va. Leaf Tobacco Co., 312 Ky. 849, 229 S.W.2d
953 (1950).
339 368 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1963).3 40 Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Davis, 368 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Ky. 1963).
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XII. TORTS
The practitioner was little affected by the decisions in this field
during the past term. However, there were some new rules laid down
and two cases which indicated that the court may adopt different
rules on two points in the future.
The indications were in the areas of last clear chance and res
ipsa loquitur as they apply in negligence cases. In Riley v. Horn-
buckle,341 the court of appeals held that an admission in an opening
statement does not justify a directed verdict for the other party if the
person can, by his direct evidence, avoid its consequences. In this
case the plaintiff's counsel admitted that the deceased was a pedestrian
upon an expressway. A municipal ordinance, with certain exceptions,
prohibited pedestrians from traversing the expressway. The directed
verdict was granted on the ground that the admitted violation of the
ordinance by the deceased was negligent per se and barred a
recovery. The case was reversed upon two grounds. First, the plain-
tiff should have been given a chance to prove by his evidence that
the deceased's presence on the expressway was justified under one of
the ordinance's exceptions. Second, even if he could not, the case
should have been submitted to the jury on the issue of last clear
chance.
The court stated it was not departing from the rule of Saddler v.
Parkam,342 which required that before an instruction on the doctrine
may be given, the evidence must warrant a conclusion that the
defendant "must have" discovered the plaintiffs peril in time to avoid
the injury. Nevertheless, the court still said that an instruction on the
doctrine in the Saddler case should have been given. The obvious
conclusion is that the court has indicated in the Riley case that the
limited application of the doctrine is perhaps to be somewhat relaxed.
In Kentucky Home Life Insurance Company v. Wise,343 the court
awarded a new trial in an action for injuries sustained by the plaintiff
when an elevator in the defendant's building fell a short distance,
because the instruction submitted by the lower court did not require
the jury to find negligence. Its effect was the imposition of liability
without fault if the jury believed that the elevator fell and the plaintiff
was injured.
The court took this occasion to comment generally upon the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although the doctrine was unquestion-
ably applicable in this case. The court seemed to say that in a res
341 866 S.W.2d 804 (Ky. 1968).
342 249 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1952).
343 364 S.W.2d 38 (Ky. 1963).
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ipsa case, if the circumstantial evidence presented justifies a mere
inference of negligence, a directed verdict may never be granted and
the case must be submitted to the jury. However, if the justifiable
inference is very strong and goes unrebutted, then a directed verdict
may properly be granted. In such a case, the permissive inference
becomes a presumption. While it has been said that a defendant
may be entitled to a directed verdict in a res ipsa case,344 the court
has never gone so far as to say that the plaintiff can ever be so
entitled. Yet there are jurisdictions which follow such a rule,345 and
the indication is Kentucky may follow.
In a closely related case, the court decided that mere ownership
of an automobile raises a rebuttable presumption that the owner was
driving at the time an accident occurred. Lee v. Tucker 46 involved
an action by the administrator of a deceased person's estate against
the estate of an owner of an automobile involved in a fatal crash.
The defendant contended that the deceased, not the owner, was
driving at the time of the crash. The jury, in answer to a special
interrogatory, decided that it could not determine which person was
driving the automobile at the time of the accident. The dismissal
of the action was affirmed on the ground that the defendant hadput
forth sufficient proof to rebut the presumption. Therefore, the pre-
sumption was reduced to a permissive inference and since the jury
was unable to decide who was driving, the action was properly
dismissed.3 47
McMichael v. Shircliffe348 established a new rule to be followed
in applying KRS 189.330(4) to cases involving collisions at inter-
sections where traffic on a multiple-lane one-way street has the right
of way. That statute requires the vehicle upon the inferior street to
stop and yield the right of way to traffic on the through street which
is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. The
court held that the driver on the inferior street is entitled to assume
that the other driver will remain in the same lane and he may guage
the hazard before he enters the intersection based upon the lane
the approaching vehicle is in.
In the interesting case of Potts v. Krey,349 the court held that
where there is no direct evidence that a pedestrian can be seen by a
driver, if the circumstantial evidence indicates that he must have been
344 Vernon v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1960).
345 Prosser, Torts 211-217 (1955).
346 865 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963).
347 Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 988 (1953).
348 365 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1963).
34 9 $62 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1962).
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in a position to be seen, the jury may find the driver negligent for
failure to keep a proper lookout ahead. The defendant testified that
he did not see the boy until the moment of impact. The plaintiff did
not testify, but the circumstantial evidence showed that there were
no obstructions to vision on the street other than telephone poles,
spaced seventy-five feet apart and fifteen feet from the curb. A verdict
for the plaintiff was appealed and the court affirmed a denial of a
directed verdict. It rested the decision upon the well settled rule
that a driver not only has a duty to keep a lookout ahead, but also a
duty to see what he should see.350
Finally, in Phelps Roofing Company v. Johnson,351 the court upheld
an imposition of liability upon a contractor for the fatal injury
sustained by the guest of a lessee of an apartment. The floor and
back stairway of the apartment had been removed and was being
replaced. The deceased opened the back door of the lessee's apart-
ment, stepped out, and fell to her death. The court held as a matter
of law that there was a breach of a duty to keep safe a part of the
premises appurtenant to those leased, which the lessees and their
guests were entitled to use. The breach consisted of a failure either
to bar the apartment doors opening at that point, or to post warning
signs of danger. While our court has long recognized the liability
of the lessor in such a situation,352 the case is of special interest
because it logically extends the rule. The contractor who creates the
dangerous condition has now had its liability judicially recognized.
35o Tuggle v. Taylor, 282 S.W.2d 615 (Ky. 1955).
351 368 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1955).
352 Dixon v. Wootton, 307 Ky. 338, 210 S.W.2d 967 (1948).
XIII. CONSORTIUM
The antiquated rule that a wife cannot maintain an action for the
loss or ampairment of her husband's consortium caused by the
negligence of a third party was affirmed in Baird v. Cincinnati, New
Orleans & Texas Pacific Railroad Company.353 The court, while recog-
nizing the persuasiveness of recent decisions allowing recovery in such
cases in Missouri 354 and Illinois,355 chose to adhere to its former
decisions in Cravens v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company
356
and LeEase v. Cincinnati, Newport & Covington Railroad Company 57
denying the wife's right to recovery. Pointing out that the right of a
husband to recover for the loss of his wife's consortium due to the
negligence of a third party is recognized in Kentucky, 58 the court
stated that the wife may recover only where the loss of her husband's
consortium is due to an intentional or malicious act. 59
The rule refusing liability to a wife for loss of her husband's
consortium is predicated upon the status and position of the wife
during ancient times under common law. A wife was then subservient
to her husband, a non-entity under the principal of unity, and devoid
of any right to bring any action in law.360 The husband, however, was
entitled to damages for loss or impairment of his wife's consortium.
Later courts perpetuated his right, but as the wife's status and
position in society and law e-olved to a level of equality, the courts
still continued to refuse the converse of the rule.8 6 1 Since 1950, numer-
ous courts have divorced themselves from the old rule and recognized
the wife's right of action in such cases.8 6 2 The Kentucky court
3533 68 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1963).
354 Novak v. Kansas City Transit Co., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963), reversing
Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1918).
355Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960), following
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811, cert. den. 340 U.S. 852
(1950); see also Rollins v. District of Columbia, 265 F.2d 347 (D.C. 1959).
In the Naiditch case supra, the court saw no judicial sagacity in 'looking back-
ward and parrotting the words and analyses of other courts so as to embalm for
posterity the legal consequences of the past." 20 Ill.2d at ......... 170 N.E.2d at
892. Three judges dissented on the ground that neither wife nor husband should
have a right of action for loss of consortium. Id. at ........ 170 N.E.2d at 893.
356 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922).
357 249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952).
35s Commercial Carriers v. Small, 277 Ky. 189, 126 S.W.2d 143 (1939).
359 Baird v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. R.R., supra note 353, at 173.
360 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 433-436, 442 (1897).
361See Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra note 18, at ........ , 183 F.2d at 819;
Commercial Carriers v. Small, supra note 21, at 196 S.W.2d at 146.
862 See, e.g., Stenta v. Leblang, 185 A.2d 759 (Del. 1962); Walden v. Cole-
man, 105 Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E.2d 313 (1962); Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77,
109 N.E.2d 407 (1952); Acuff v. Schmit, 78 N.W.2d 480 (Iowa 1956); Mariani
v. Nanni, 185 A.2d 119 (R.I. 1962); Hoekstra v. Helgeland, 98 N.W.2d 669
(S.D. 1959).
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admitted that the distinction between the husband's right of recovery
and that of the wife is "at odds with reason," 63 but concluded by
saying, "Nevertheless, since there is a diversity of opinion among the
courts in other jurisdictions and this court has heretofore declined
from its earlier decision, having regard for the doctrine of stare
decisis, we affirm the judgment."
64
363 Baird v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. R.R., 268 S.W.2d 172, 174
(Ky. 1963).
364 Ibid. Two judges dissented, criticizing the majority for applying stare
decisis to continue the operation of an outmoded principle. They aligned them-
selves with the view expressed by Schaefer, 0.J., in his dissenting opinion in the
Naiditch case, supra note 18, at ......... 170 N.E.2d at 893, to the effect that
neither husband nor wife should be allowed to sue for loss or impairment of
consortium. See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1378 (1952).
XIV. ETHICS
In In re Advisory Opinion of Kentucky Bar Association, 65 the
court determined that there was no conflict of interest where a law
partnership was retained to prosecute a civil claim against a third
class city and subsequently one of the partners was elected prosecuting
attorney for the same city. The court reasoned that since the law
partnership did not require the newly elected prosecuting attorney to
be active in the civil suit, there was no conflict of interest within the
meaning of Cannon 6.366 This was the first Kentucky case directly in
point.
385 861 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. 1962).
366 American Bar Ass'n, Canons of Professional Ethics, Cannon 6, which
provides in part: "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except
y express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure."
XV. PROCEDURE
The procedure cases decided during the last term of the court of
appeals are roughly classed into four areas: (1) pre-trial procedure,
(2) trial procedure, (3) post-trial procedure, and (4) appellate
procedure. Some of the cases in this survey are related; however,
many others are not related to any other procedural issue decided
during this term.
A. Pmx-rnIA PRocEDmE
The cases decided in the last term dealing with pre-trial procedure
involved a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, a similar motion treated as a motion for a
summary judgment, the form of a complaint, separate trials, parties,
a default judgment, a judgment on the pleadings, and res judicata
pleaded as a bar.
In the case of Huie v. Jones,3 67 the court of appeals held that in
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, the trial court should not dismiss unless it
appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any
state of fact which could be proven in support of his claim.368 This
decision indicates that the court expects trial courts to comply with
the spirit of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure in liberally con-
struing pleadings, thus pointing up a change from the old Civil
Code.369
In the case of Spillman v. Beauchamp,3 70 the defendant moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
and submitted a memorandum in support thereof. The trial court, in
considering the motion to dismiss, did not exclude the memorandum,
which set forth a statement of facts not set out in the pleadings and
thus treated the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment3 71
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court erroneously
considered the memorandum submitted by the defendant as "matter
outside the pleading" as contemplated by CR 12.02. The court, in
conforming to the interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
367 362 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1962).
368 Ingram v. Ingram, 283 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1955).
369 Perry v. Creech Coal Co., 55 F. Supp. 998 (E.D.Ky. 1944).
370 362 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1962).
371 CR 12.02 provides that,
If, on a motion asserting the defense that the pleading fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56 ...
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12(b),372 held that statements of fact in a legal memorandum are not
within the category of "matters outside the pleading" contemplated
by CR 12.02. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial
court is entitled to consider any evidentiary matter that has been
presented to the court at any stage of the proceedings.373 Statements
of fact in a legal memorandum are not evidentiary matters. The court
pointed out that before a summary judgment can be granted, it must
appear that there is no genuine issue of material fact presented. Even
if properly considered, the facts presented in the memorandum con-
troverted allegations of the complaint, thus creating genuine issues of
material fact. This case was apparently one of first impression and
the court followed the federal courts.
The case of Edester v. Heady374 involved three separate procedural
points. The plaintiffs were a husband and wife suing jointly for
personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The defendants
asserted a counterclaim against the husband for contribution and the
trial court treated this as a third-party complaint. The plaintiffs
requested separate trials, but when this was refused they attempted
to make the defendant's liability insurer a party to the action. This
request was also refused. On appeal, the court held that the trial
court properly allowed the defendant's counterclaim for contribution
to have the effect of a third-party complaint. If construed narrowly,
CR 14.01, which establishes third-party practice, would require sever-
ance of the claims of the husband and wife and allow the third-party
complaint to go only against the husband. The court held that
formal severance was not necessary because technically the husband
was not a party to the wife's claim and could properly be brought in
as a third-party defendant to her claim. This decision liberally con-
strues CR 14.01, which is substantially the same as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 14(a). In a similar situation, a federal court con-
strued the Federal Rule as requiring formal severance of claims.
375
The trial court's refusal to allow separate trials was held not to
be an abuse of discretion. The court indicated that as long as issues
are properly triable at one time and arise out of the same transaction,
there is no abuse of discretion in refusing to allow separate trials.
The court held that the trial court properly refused to join the
defendant's liability insurer as a party defendant. The court dis-
tinguished between a liability insurer and a collision insurer, saying
that the former does not incur any liability until judgment is entered
372 United States v. Tuteur, 215 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1954).
373 Collins v. Duff, 283 S.W.2d 179 (Ky. 1955).
374 364 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1963).375 Smith v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 39 (M.D.Penn. 1955).
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against him, and does not become a real party in interest until then,
whereas the latter has incurred liability when damage is inflicted.
The court considered this to be a well settled rule, citing Mayer v.
Dickerson.
76
In considering the propriety of a default judgment in the case of
Cash v. E'Town Furniture Company,37 7 the court held that a judgment
by default may not be entered in a transitory action against a
defendant who is not a resident of the county in which the action is
brought, who is not served with summons in that county, and who
has not made a defense to the action before a judgment is entered.
Prior to the adoption of the Kentucky Civil Rules of Procedure, a
default judgment entered under these circumstances would have been
void.373 The earlier decisions were based upon the Civil Code. At
the time the Civil Rules were adopted, the pertinent Civil Code
sections were transferred to the statutes.379 Therefore, these sections
are applicable unless the Civil Rules take precedence. These statutes
are concerned with jurisdiction and venue over which the Civil Rules
have no control.380 This case is a clarification of existing venue and
jurisdictional requirements. No change is made in existing law. The
point to take note of is that KRS 452.480 and KRS 452.485 must be
complied with before a default judgment can be properly taken.
In the case of Archer v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Com-
pany,381 the court held that the trial court properly entered a judg-
ment for the defendant on the plaintiffs motion for a judgment on the
pleadings, where the plaintiff did not deny the defendant's allegations,
and in applying the law to those allegations, the defendant was entitled
to judgment. The court pointed out that for purposes of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, allegations which are not denied stand
admitted. The case merely holds that in considering a motion for a
judgment on the pleadings, all well pleaded allegations are taken as
true when not denied, and allegations in the defendant's answer,
where the plaintiff is the movant, are likewise taken as admitted
when not denied. When acting on the motion, the court may give
judgment to the plaintiff or defendant, according to the effect of
applying the law to the pleadings.
In the case of Hall v. Nopli, 382 the court held that a judgment
376 321 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1959). See also, Dunaway v. Darnell, 302 S.W.2d
122 (Ky. 1957); Wright v. Kinslow, 264 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1954).
377 363 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. 1962).
378 Grover v. Wheeler, 296 Ky. 734, 178 S.W.2d 404 (1944).
379 KRS 452.480, 452.485.
380 CR 82.
381 365 S.W.2d 727 (Ky. 1962).
382 367 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1963).
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rendered prior to an intervening decision creating an altered situation
is not res judicata. The earlier judgment concluded the rights of the
parties as they were at the time, and under the conditions then
existing. The court stated that where a continuing relationship
between the parties exists, a judgment cannot fix the rights of the
parties forever. This is a restatement of existing law.
383
B. TIuL4x PROCEDufE
The cases decided during the last term which involved trial pro-
cedure included a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
plaintiffs opening statement, the proof required to establish the
absence of a witness for purposes of introducing a deposition, prej-
udicial misconduct, the propriety of an instruction under the rule
against giving undue prominence to specific issues or evidence, and
the extent of the trial court's control over judgment once entered.
In the case of Riley v. Hornbucke,38 4 the court held that a directed
verdict, rendered after the plaintiff's opening statement, is made
proper by what the opening statement says and not what it fails to
say. This decision pointed up the fact that a party has not rested his
case after giving his opening statement to the jury, but still has ample
opportunity to prove his allegations. A directed verdict after an open-
ing statement is proper only where there is an admission which is
fatal to the case. This is a restatement of existing law.385
In Potts v. Krey,3 8 6 the court considered whether the actions of the
plaintiff's mother constituted prejudicial misconduct entitling the
defendant to a new trial. The court held that where the mother of
the plaintiff requested one of the jurors, during a recess, to ask a person
in the hall to bring the injured plaintiff into the courtroom, there was
no prejudicial misconduct. This case points out what seems to be a
tendency of the court to apply a "totality of the facts" approach in
this type of case. Earlier cases decided by the court on what con-
stitutes prejudicial misconduct required conduct which, considered
under all the circumstances, goes beyond casual contact.3 87 If it can
be shown that someone discusses the case with a juror, this would be
sufficient misconduct to require a new trial.3
88
383State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945); Smith v.
Campbell, 286 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1956).
384 366 S.W.2d 304 (Ky. 1963).
385 Co-de Coal Co. v. Combs, 325 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. 1959); Raco Corp. v.
Edwards, 272 S.W.2d 845 (Ky. 1954); Hill v. Kesselring, 220 S.W.2d 858 (Ky.
1949).
3868362 S.W.2d 726 (Ky. 1962).
387 Whitcomb v. Wbitcomb, 267 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. 1954); Bee's Old Reliable
Shows, Inc. v. Maupin's Adm'x, 226 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1950).
388 Ibid.
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Another issue raised in this case was whether a question pro-
pounded by the plaintiff's counsel was so prejudicial that it could not
be cured by an admonition. Counsel for the plaintiff asked the
defendant whether he had been warned about speeding by the local
police, an objection was made, but in the meantime the defendant
answered in the negative. The court admonished the jury not to
consider the question and answer. The court of appeals held that
such a question, although improper, was not so prejudicial it could
not be cured by the admonition. This restates existing law.
3 9
In the case of Phelps Roofing Company v. Johnson,390 the trial
court limited instructions to salient facts in issue on which the con-
clusion of liability or non-liability depended. On appeal, the de-
fendant contended that this was error in that it violated the rule
against giving undue prominence to certain facts and issues. The
court held that where certain acts and omissions constitute negligence
as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to instructions so stating.
The court further held that such instructions do not violate the "undue
prominence" rule. The court cited Barker v. Sanders,391 which favored
simplifying the instructions to precise points in issue. Earlier cases,
however, had prohibited pointing out and emphasizing in the instruc-
tions particular parts of the evidence.392 The instant case, together
with the Barker case, relaxes the requirements of the "undue promi-
nence" rule in the formulating of instructions.
In the case of Carpenter v. Evans, 93 the court held that the trial
court, where timely motion is filed, has authority to reverse previous
findings and conclusions and enter new findings and conclusions and
judgment thereon. Where the trial is without a jury, the trial court
may grant a new trial or in the alternative enter new findings,
conclusions and judgment where justice requires such action.3 94 The
appellant contended that the entry of prior judgment was res judicata.
The court of appeals dismissed this contention holding that under
a motion pursuant to CR 59.07, the trial court retains control over the
case although judgment has been entered. Commissioner Clay's
interpretation of this Rule is in agreement with this decision.395
389 Leming's Adm'r v. Leechman, 268 Ky. 781, 105 S.W.2d 1043 (1937).
390 368 S.W.2d 320 (Ky. 1963).
391 347 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1961).
392 Compton v. Smith, 286 Ky. 179, 150 S.W.2d 657 (1941); Jones v. Sharp's
Adm'r, 282 Ky. 638, 139 S.W.2d 731 (1940).
393 363 S.W.2d 108 (Ky. 1962).
894 CR 59.07.
395 Clay, Kentucky Practice 527 (1963).
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C. POST-TRIAL PROCEDURE
The court of appeals decided several cases dealing with the time
limit for filing notice of appeal, the time limit for filing record on
appeal, the extension of such limitations, and supersedas bonds.
In the case of Webb Transfer Line, Incorporated v. Meigs,396 the
court granted a petition for mandamus directing a circuit judge to
hear a request for extension of time for filing a notice of appeal. The
petitioner had waived notice of entry of judgment, and the respondent
judge had ruled that he was precluded from considering a request for
extension of time for filing notice of appeal, because CR 77.04, as
interpreted by him, did not authorize the court to relieve a party for
failure to appeal within the time alloted. CR 77.04, however, is
conditioned on the provisions contained in CR 73.02.397 The court
of appeals pointed out in this decision that under CR 73.02(1), an
appeal may be taken within thirty days from entry of judgment, but
if a party fails to learn of entry of judgment, the Rule permits an
extension of thirty days upon a showing of excusable neglect.398 The
court reasoned that since the waiver of notice of entry did not
establish that petitioners had actually learned of the entry of judg-
ment, the trial court should determine whether petitioners neglect
was excusable. The opinion is a clarification of existing law.399
In another case involving extension of time for making an appeal,
the court held that the circuit court could not extend the time for
filing the record on appeal where the order for extension was made
after the expiration of the period for filing, but was mailed to the
clerk prior to the end of that period. This decision was made in Powell
v. Blevins,400 which involved an attempt to correct nunc pro tunc the
failure of either the clerk or the judge in not filing an order for an
extension, as requested by the appellant. The court reasoned that an
order nunc pro tune can only supply a record of something done at the
time to which it is retroactive. The court's reasoning is supported by
an earlier decision wherein the court, in speaking of a nunc pro tune
order, stated,
... [T]he power of the court to make such entries is restricted to placing
in record evidence of judicial action which has been actually taken. It
may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not to make it
speak what it did not speak but ought to have spoken. 40o
896 361 S.W.2d 761 (Ky. 1962).
397 CR 77.04.
398 United Carbon Co. v. Ramsey, 350 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1961).
399 CR 77.04(4).
400 365 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1963).
4 0 1 Benton v. King, 199 Ky. 307, 250 S.W. 1002, 1003 (Ky. 1923).
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The court dismissed the appellant's contention that the failure to
file the signed order for extension of time was a clerical error which
could be corrected pursuant to CR 75.08. The court held that an
omission to have the order signed by the circuit court judge was not
a "clerical error" within CR 75.08.402
In the case of Moss v. Smith,40 3 the court held that a surety on a
supersedes bond executed in connection with appeal from a judgment
and order of sale of realty, is liable for all rents, hire, and damages
which might accrue during pendency of appeal, if the bond so states.
The words "all rents, hire, and damages" appearing in the bond do
not controvene CR 73.04. They serve only to state the purport of the
bond more specifically as it applies to the particular situation. The
pertinent language of CR 73.04 provides that:
... the amount of the supersedes bond shall be fixed at such sum only
as will secure the amount recovered for the use and detention of the
property, the cost of the action, cost on appeal, interest, ...404
This case clarifies CR 73.04 and establishes that the intent at the time
of adoption of the Civil Rules was to re-embody all of the essential
elements of liability recited in the old Civil Code section.40 5
In the case of United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v.
Maryland Casualty Company,40 0 the court held that an entry of judg-
ment for defendant operated to discharge an attachment and the
taking of appeal from the judgment without superseding it did not
suspend the operation of the judgment as a discharge of attachment.
The surety on the attachment bond was held not to be liable for
damages accrued during the pendency of the appeal.
D. APPLATE PxocxuiREn
The cases decided by the court of appeals during the last term
involving appellate procedure are best separated into two categories:
(1) those involving original proceedings in the court of appeals, and
(2) those dealing with appeals from lower court decisions.
1. Original proceedings
The cases decided in the area of original proceedings deal primarily
with the writ of prohibition. In the case of Jake's Fork Coal Company
v. Wells, 40 7 petitioners were seeking to prohibit the circuit judge from
402 Cf., Maslow Cooperage Corp. v. Jones, 316 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. 1958).
403 361 S.W.2d 511 (Ky. 1962).
404 CR 73.04.
4 05 Ky. Civ. Code Prac. § 748.
406 367 S.W.2d 455 (Ky. 1963).
407 363 S.W.2d 728 (Ky. 1962).
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presiding in a case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition hold-
ing that there will be no writ of prohibition unless the petitioners
show that they will have no adequate relief by appeal, or otherwise.
The requirement of showing irreparable injury, prior to the granting
of a writ of prohibition, is one of long standing.
408
The petitioners also sought to have the trial court's ruling on
motion to vacate reviewed in this original proceeding. The court
refused. In so doing, they reasoned that the damage inflicted by a
refusal to vacate remains prospective in that it must result from
further and subsequent conduct of the proceedings.
In Hettich v. Coleson,409 the petitioner requested a writ of prohibi-
tion from the circuit court. The circuit court had refused to take
jurisdiction of an appeal from the respondent police court on the
ground that the respondent was acting within its jurisdiction. Under
the Civil Code, the circuit courts had no power to issue writs of
prohibition against inferior courts acting erroneously within their
jurisdiction.4 10 This power was to be exercised only by the court of
appeals.41 ' The court pointed out that earlier decisions in similar fact
situations where based upon provisions of the Civil Code, but held
that CR 81 repealed the Civil Code provisions, and thus gave the
petitioner relief in the circuit court. Therefore, a petition to the court
of appeals for writ of prohibition was unwarranted.
The case of Commonwealth v. Bullit County Circuit Court4 12 was
an original proceeding for writ of prohibition directing the circuit
court to withhold, quash, and set aside execution issued against the
Commonwealth. The petitioner did not make the circuit judge a
party, and the writ was denied. The court held that a proceeding
for writ of prohibition was a personal action and that the officer
against whom the writ was sought must have been joined as a party.
In this case only a judical entity was named, but this entity cannot
take any action except through a presiding judge.
Combs v. Matthews418 was an original proceeding wherein the
Governor of Kentucky sought a declaratory judgment from the court
of appeals. The court held that the rights of litigants may be declared
in advance of action when a justiciable controversy is presented if
the advance determination of the rights would eliminate or minimize
risks of wrong action. The court herein rendered a declaratory judg-
4o Musgrave v. Hayes, 354 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1962).
409 366 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1963).
410 Ky* Civ. Code Prac. § 479.
411 Commonwealth ex rel. Breckenridge v. Noe, 858 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1962);
Potter v. Trivitte, 303 Ky. 216, 197 S.W.2d 245 (1946).
412 365 S.W.2d 106 (Ky. 1963).
413 864 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. 1963).
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ment pursuant to existing statutes.4 14 The court stated that justici-
ability turns on evaluation of both the appropriateness of issues for
decision and the hardship of denying judicial relief. This indicates
that the court will approach the question of justiciability on a case by
case basis.
2. Appeals from lower court decisions
In Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Wise,415
the court held that where a judgment was set aside on appeal, the
question of excessive damages was not to be considered by the court
since evidence on retrial might not be the same. If the question of
liability is to be reconsidered in a new trial, the award of damages
at the original trial is of no effect, and the question of whether those
damages were excessive becomes moot. The court will not entertain
moot questions.416 This is a restatement of prior law. 417
In Epling v. Ratliff,418 the claimant had received an adverse ruling
from a referee of The Workman's Compensation Board. Instead of
asserting his right to a hearing before the full board, the claimant
appealed directly to the circuit court, which assumed jurisdiction and
reversed the referee's decision. On appeal to the court of appeals, the
appellant contended that the referee's decision was not a final order,
since it remained subject to review by the full board, and therefore
the circuit court acted without jurisdiction. The appellee argued that
the circuit court had not yet acted on the appellants motion to set
aside the judgment, and that the court of appeals lacked the power
to review a void judgment before the motion to set aside had been
passed upon by the circuit court. The appellee apparently was
relying on Civil Code section 763, which in essence conformed to
his argument. The court of appeals held, however, that CR 60.02 and
KRS 21.068 had superseded the Code provision, and since they con-
tain no specific language prohibiting such a review, the court may
consider the question of jurisdiction and in declaring the judgment
void, it could restore the parties to their original positions without
prejudice to either, and that a technicality should not be allowed to
preclude this substantively desirable result.
An interesting point regarding land condemnation for the use of a
municipal airport was involved in the case of Bowling Green-Warren
County Airport Board v. Long.419 The substative question was
1-14 KRS 418.040, 418.055.
415 364 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1963).416 Wilkerson v. Story, 340 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1960).
417 Price v. Bates, 320 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1959).
418 364 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1963).
419 364 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1962).
[Vol 52,
CouRT OF APPEALS BEvmw
whether the award should include an amount for the taking of "air
easements" over adjacent land, it being admitted that adjacent land
was being restricted in its use by its proximity to the airfield. The
procedural question was whether an award for "air easements" could
be included in consequential damages, although the pleadings did not
raise the issue of "air easements." The court held that CR 15.02,
which permits amendment of pleadings to conform to the issues
tried, may be invoked at the appellate level. Here the pleadings did
not interject the question of "air easements," but evidence relating to
them was admitted without objection. This evidence established the
fact that such easements were being taken. At the trial an award for
consequential damages was granted. The court of appeals treated
this award as including an award for the "air easement." Apparently
amendment of pleadings to conform to the proof is an automatic
process unless objection is made at the time of introduction of
evidence related to issues not raised by the pleadings.420 This case is
a restatement of existing law42- and follows federal court decisions
construing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(b).422
In Wooley v. Spalding,42 the appellants filed a separate appeal
from a modified judgment while an appeal from the original judgment
was pending. The separate appeal was dismissed. The court held
that the proper procedure to secure review of the modified judgment,
where an appeal from the original judgment was pending, was to file
a supplemental record on the original appeal and present grounds
for review in a supplemental brief. This seems to be a case of first
impression.
420 See Coleman v. Greer, 343 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1961).
421 Ibid.422 Purofied Down Products Corp. v. Traveler's Fire Ins. Co., 278 F.2d 439
(2d Cir. 1960).
423 365 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1962).
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